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This paper empirically investigates the possible market power effects of vertical integration proposed
in the theoretical literature on vertical foreclosure.  It uses a rich data set of cement and ready-mixed
concrete plants that spans several decades to perform a detailed case study.  There is little evidence
that foreclosure is quantitatively important in these industries.  Instead, prices fall, quantities rise, and
entry rates remain unchanged when markets become more integrated.  These patterns are consistent,
however, with an alternative efficiency-based mechanism.  Namely, higher productivity producers
are more likely to vertically integrate and are also larger, more likely to survive, and charge lower
prices.  We find evidence that integrated producers' productivity advantage is tied to improved logistics
coordination afforded by large local concrete operations.  Interestingly, this benefit is not due to firms'
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Is vertical integration a device for firms to create and harness market power, or does it 
enhance efficiency and improve social welfare?  This paper looks at this issue in two vertically 
linked industries, using a rich data set on their producers, by investigating patterns of prices, 
productivity, entry, exit, and scale across integrated and unintegrated firms. 
The reasons for, and results of, vertical integration (VI) have been a topic of considerable 
attention since Coase’s (1937) landmark paper.  Since then, economic theories of vertical 
mergers have evolved both in response to and as drivers of antitrust policy.  Along with 
theoretical developments in efficiency-based theories of vertical integration, recent years have 
also seen the introduction of new theoretical arguments for the possible harm that can arise 
through vertical integration’s foreclosure, or market power, effect.
1
This study utilizes integration episodes in the cement (SIC 3241) and ready-mixed 
concrete (SIC 3273) industries between 1963 and 1997 as an empirical laboratory to investigate 
the causes and consequences of vertical mergers.
2  A first look at simple patterns in the data is 
instructive.  Table 1 shows how the prices and quantities sold in downstream industry (ready-
mixed concrete) markets are related to the extent of vertical integration in those markets.  The 
table reports coefficients obtained by regressing local average (logged) concrete prices or total 
(logged) quantities on, depending on the specification, either the market share or number of 
vertically integrated firms in the downstream market.  Specifications are reported both excluding 
and including market fixed effects.
3  (Year fixed effects are included in all specifications to 
account for aggregate movements.  We will further detail our sample, construction of the 
variables, and the market definition below.) 
As the table makes apparent, the greater the presence of vertically integrated firms in a 
market, whether measured by their market share or number, the lower are prices and the higher 
                                                 
1 Efficiency reasons for integration are espoused in, for example, Williamson (1971) and Grossman and Hart (1986).  
Work on foreclosure includes Salinger (1988), Ordover, Saloner, and Salop (1990), Hart and Tirole (1990), Bolton 
and Whinston (1993), Riordan (1998), and Nocke and White (2005).  Snyder (1995), Rey and Tirole (forthcoming), 
and Bernheim and Whinston (2004) offer comprehensive surveys. 
2 While often interchanged colloquially, cement is not concrete.  Cement—made by baking limestone and clay or 
shale together in a kiln and grinding the result into a powder—is a single but important ingredient in concrete 
production.  Ready-mixed concrete is produced by mixing cement with sand, gravel, water, and chemical 
admixtures, and is what is contained in the familiar trucks with the spinning barrels on their backs.  Thus cement is 
the upstream industry and ready-mixed the downstream industry. 
3 Coefficients in the latter case thus reflect how concrete prices and quantities change within a market when that 
market becomes more vertically integrated. 
  1are quantities in the local ready-mixed concrete market.  These specifications are very simple 
and subject to deeper investigation below, but they do suggest at a first glance that factors other 
than foreclosure may be driving patterns in the data.  We will see that these results are in fact 
robust, with foreclosure having little role in explaining what happens when firms in these 
industries vertically integrate. 
While foreclosure effects do not appear to explain the data, an efficiency-based 
explanation may.  Indeed, as we will show, once we explicitly account for efficiency differences, 
the impact of vertical integration on market-level outcomes ceases to be statistically and 
economically significant in most of our specifications.  Plant level evidence also reveals a strong 
relationship between vertical integration and productivity, especially downstream.  Integrated 
ready-mixed concrete plants are more productive than unintegrated plants, even those in the 
same market. 
What, then, is the efficiency benefit of vertical integration?  We argue in Section V that 
in these particular industries, the benefit might not arise due to vertical integration per se.  
Instead, efficiency gains appear to be sourced in firms’ abilities to operate multiple ready-mixed 
plants in the same market.  This allows firms to harness, if they have the necessary managerial 
talent, scale economies tied to logistical coordination: deliveries of the industry’s highly 
perishable product, typically ordered on very short notice by consumers at multiple locations, 
can be made more efficiently by having a central dispatch office that substitutes production and 
delivery among the firm’s several local plants.  We show how this efficiency gain is consistent 
with several features of our data as well as with the stated intentions and operational practices of 
firms with multiple concrete plants in the same market.  While these are in many cases vertically 
integrated firms, the evidence suggests they need not have a vertical structure to benefit from 
such gains.  This is reflected most tellingly in the evidence we document that vertically 
integrated concrete plants are no more efficient than those owned by non-vertically integrated 
multi-unit firms with total local concrete sales of equal size.
4
The cement and ready-mixed concrete industries have several practical features of that 
make them favorable for a case study, and we will discuss these further below.  Perhaps the most 
salient motivation for investigating these industries is that vertical integration among their 
                                                 
4 As explained further in Sections II and III, our data allows us to link plants at the firm level.  A firm that owns 
multiple production plants in any industry (or industries) is a multi-unit firm.  Vertically integrated firms, which own 
concrete and cement plants specifically, are a subset of multi-unit firms. 
  2producers has been the focus of substantial policy attention.  U.S. antitrust authorities challenged 
the legality of several mergers in the late 1960s and early 1970s (no other industry saw as many 
vertical merger cases brought), and more recent cases have been considered by competition 
authorities in Europe, New Zealand, and Brazil.  Thus our findings may be interesting from a 
policy evaluation perspective.
5
This paper builds on an empirical literature that, compared to the resurgent theoretical 
literature surrounding the vertical foreclosure debate, has been relatively thin.  Grimm, Winston 
and Evans (1992) study railroad destination pairs served by a single firm and find that increased 
interline competition—competing railroads that connect intermediate points on the otherwise 
monopolized route—reduces welfare distortion.  Waterman and Weiss (1996) and Chipty (2001) 
show that U.S. cable television systems integrated with content providers are more likely to 
include their own suppliers’ paid content.  Chipty (2001), however, argues that higher quality 
programming is offered in integrated markets, resulting in higher consumer surplus.  Hastings 
and Gilbert (2005) utilize both within- and across-market variation in integration status among 
producers of wholesale gasoline.  They examine the effect of vertical mergers on the wholesale 
price paid by competing independent gasoline retailers, and find that the closer the competitor, 
the higher the wholesale price it has to pay.
6  Asker (2004) tests for foreclosure due to exclusive 
dealing relationships in beer distribution and finds no significant evidence that exclusive dealing 
increases market power.  Rosengren and Meehan (1994) also find no support for foreclosure 
theory in event studies of the effects of vertical merger announcements and antitrust challenges 
on the stock prices of merging and rival firms.  Snyder (1995), however, uses similar methods on 
a different set of industries and finds support for foreclosure.
7
                                                 
5 It should be made clear that we are not trying to evaluate the appropriateness of the antitrust authorities’ actions in 
any particular case.  We are investigating all mergers between U.S. producers in the two industries, not just those 
that were the subject of legal action. 
6 Hastings (2004) analyzes the impact of a multi-market vertical merger on retail gasoline prices in California.  She 
finds that reducing the market share of unintegrated retailers led to higher retail prices.  However, she does not draw 
a connection between her work and the foreclosure literature, instead ascribing the finding to product differentiation 
between branded and unbranded gasoline. 
7 The aforementioned policy actions against cement and concrete producers in the 1960s and 1970s also spurred at 
the time a small literature on the impact of forward integration by cement producers.  These papers preceded the 
recent theoretical literature on foreclosure, and as such do not directly test for such effects.  They did, however, 
center on the issue of whether and how integration might enhance market power.  Allen (1971) reviews evidence 
brought forth in the Federal Trade Commission’s 1966 report on these industries (U.S. FTC 1966).  While 
institutionally instructive, this study does not conduct formal statistical tests of economic hypotheses.  McBride 
(1983) attempts to do so, finding a negative correlation between average cement prices in 17 markets and the 
  3The next section documents cement and ready-mixed concrete’s patterns of integration 
over the sample period.  It also discusses the evolution of economic theories of vertical 
integration over the same time frame, because this academic debate was mirrored by adjustments 
in policies aimed at vertical integration in the two industries.  The third section describes the data 
used in the analysis.  In the fourth section we test the implications of foreclosure in the industry 
and compare foreclosure’s predictions to that of an alternative efficiency-based explanation.  We 
follow with a section examining this alternative in detail.  A short discussion section concludes. 
 
II. Vertical Integration in Cement and Ready-Mixed Concrete: History, Policy, and Theory 
Our data spans 34 years, from 1963 to 1997.  Over this time the cement and ready-mixed 
industries experienced two distinct periods of integration, separated by an over decade-long 
period of initial disintegration and then stability.  Table 2 shows this evolution.  Its first four 
numerical rows report the fraction of cement and concrete industry plants and sales accounted for 
by vertically integrated producers (i.e., plants in firms owning both cement and ready-mixed 
plants).  Notice that these increases in vertical integration coincide with growth in concrete 
plants in all multi-unit firms (those owning two or more plants, regardless of industry).  While all 
vertically integrated plants by our definition are in multi-unit firms, other organizational 
structures meet this condition as well: firms that own several ready-mixed plants, or firms 
owning a concrete plant(s) plus plants in another industry or industries.  Thus the overall trend in 
vertical integration in concrete was matched by similar horizontal consolidation.  This is a point 
we shall return to below when we discuss the productivity advantage of integrated producers. 
The first vertical merger wave, driven by forward integration by cement producers, 
occurred in the early and mid 1960s.  It received substantial attention from antitrust authorities.  
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) brought 15 antitrust cases during the 1960s against 
cement companies that had purchased concrete firms.  Each case ended in divestiture of ready-
mixed plants.  In its report on these industries (FTC (1966)), the Commission cited several likely 
anticompetitive effects of vertical mergers, including limitation of unintegrated cement firms’ 
                                                                                                                                                             
cumulative number of market ready-mixed plants acquired by cement firms.  He explains these results as resulting 
from the fact that forward integration into concrete makes it easier for cement plants to “adjust” their prices to 
accommodate demand swings, presumably due to (undocumented) collusive agreements in cement pricing that are 
easier to monitor than concrete prices.  However, Johnson and Parkman (1987) argue accounting for pre-existing 
price trends makes this result statistically insignificant. 
  4downstream market access, increased entry costs for unintegrated concrete firms, and reduced 
bargaining power for these unintegrated concrete producers with their suppliers. 
  The vigorous enforcement action accompanied a chilling of merger activity in the sector 
throughout the 1970s.  At the same time, however, the economic foundations of the so-called 
“naïve foreclosure theory” exemplified by the FTC report were under attack by “Chicago 
School” critiques.  Allen (1971), Posner (1976), and Bork (1978) pointed out that in cases of 
fixed-proportions technology (as cement is for ready-mixed concrete), a monopolist upstream 
producer cannot raise its profits by monopolizing its downstream market.
8  Thus, vertical 
mergers would only occur if there are efficiency gains. 
These and similar arguments influenced antitrust authorities in the Reagan and first Bush 
administrations and softened official views toward vertical mergers considerably.  In 1985, the 
FTC explicitly eased its enforcement policy regarding cement and ready-mixed vertical 
mergers.
9  Industry firms responded by reintegrating.  The fraction of cement plants in vertically 
integrated firms rose from 32.5 to 49.5 percent between 1982 and 1992, and the fraction of sales 
grew from 49.5 to 75.1 percent.  For ready-mixed the corresponding growth was from 3.0 to 11.1 
percent for plants and an 8.5 to 14.4 percent rise in the share of industry sales.
10
The theoretical debate pendulum swung back in the other direction in the late 1980s, as 
several authors formulated game-theoretic models to formalize certain conditions, robust to 
Chicago School criticisms, under which vertical mergers would have anticompetitive effects.  An 
influential example of these newer foreclosure models is the “ex-post monopolization” model of 
Hart and Tirole (1990)—hereafter denoted HT.
11  The HT framework has upstream 
                                                 
8 Vernon and Graham (1971) show that if the downstream firm can substitute away from the monopolist supplier’s 
input, a vertical acquisition may increase the monopolist’s profits, though with ambiguous welfare effects. 
9 50 Federal Register 21507 (1985). The announcement cites “developments in economic thinking” as being in part 
behind the decision.  It also states that cement mergers after 1977 were no longer subject to special consideration. 
10 The decline in integration seen from 1992 to 1997 was due to a demand-driven bout of unprecedented entry in the 
cement industry.  1997 saw a net gain of 61 plants over 1992’s 218 plants, which was roughly what had been the 
industry’s long-run average.  These new plants were primarily small, unintegrated plants specializing in grinding 
clinker (an intermediate material in the cement-making process) that was kilned elsewhere, sometimes overseas. 
11 We thank Michael Whinston for an insightful discussion that led us to this model.  Incidentally, in a section on 
applications, Hart and Tirole explicitly cite cement and ready-mixed mergers as involving the anticompetitive 
effects they highlight.  The model is also described in detail in Snyder (1995) Rey and Tirole (2003), and Bernheim 
and Whinston (2004), and is used in the experimental study of Martin, Normann, and Snyder (2001).  O’Brien and 
Shaffer (1992) show that the HT model’s assumption of Cournot competition downstream is not necessary to obtain 
foreclosure (we thank a referee for pointing us to this paper).  They derive a similar result to the one we sketch here 
  5homogeneous-good producers competing in prices.  Importantly, for reasons that will become 
clear in a moment, they are assumed to have different marginal costs.  In the cement-concrete 
context, these cost differences might arise due to productivity differences or because in a 
particular market, a local cement producer has a transport cost advantage over more distant 
producers.  Without loss of generality, one can think of the local upstream industry being 
comprised of a monopolist U that is disciplined by the potential entry of higher-cost competitors. 
Suppose that this monopolist supplies two local downstream producers, D1 and D2.  The 
structure of the game is as follows: U offers each Di a (possibly nonlinear) tariff Ti(⋅).  Di then 
orders a quantity qi and pays Ti(qi).  The Di then produce qi, observe each others’ outputs, and set 
prices.  Downstream competition is modeled as Bertrand with capacity constraints, which yields 
the Cournot outcome under conditions described in Kreps and Scheinkman (1983). 
Let (Q
m, p
m) be the monopoly price and quantity if U also had monopoly power in the 




m/2) to the downstream producers so as to achieve monopoly profits.  However, HT point out 
that offering this contract may not be credible if contracts are secret or can be secretly 
renegotiated ex-post.  If one downstream firm did agree to the above contract terms, the 
monopolist would then have an incentive to sell more than Q
m/2 to the other downstream firm.
12  
But this action would lower the profits of the first downstream firm, making it unwilling to sign 
such a contract in the first place.  HT show that the equilibrium with secretly renegotiable 
contracts has U selling Cournot quantities to the downstream firms and earning less than the 
monopoly profit. 
However, U can commit to limit total supply to the monopoly quantity by vertically 
integrating.  An integrated U could sell Q
m through its subsidiary and sell nothing to the other 
downstream firm.  This extreme outcome is unlikely in reality because the outside downstream 
firm could try to buy input from another upstream supplier, but since U has a cost advantage 
upstream—and this is where the asymmetric cost assumption is important—the integrated firm 
can (and will) also sell the input to the outside downstream firm.  However, it will be at a price 
that just undercuts the higher-cost upstream competitor.  This leads to an asymmetric Cournot 
                                                                                                                                                             
with a downstream industry comprised of differentiated-product-Bertrand competitors.  Given the spatial nature of 
ready-mixed concrete competition, this may also be a reasonable modeling framework for our purposes. 
12 The monopolist takes Q
m/2 as given for the contracted firm and reoptimizes quantity for the other firm using the 
“right-shifted” version of the residual demand curve.  This yields an optimum quantity that is greater than Q
m/2. 
  6outcome downstream, with the unintegrated downstream firm facing higher costs than its 
integrated competitor.  The greater the upstream cost asymmetry, the closer equilibrium gets to 
the monopoly outcome. 
The end results of integration, therefore, are higher average prices and lower quantities in 
the downstream output market.  Moreover, if the downstream technology has a fixed operating 
cost (or if no other upstream supplier is available), exit of unintegrated downstream firms is more 
likely.  While the above version of the model is silent about what happens to (potential) 
competitors in the upstream market, HT also provide a variant—the “scarce needs” version, in 
which two upstream competitors with the same marginal costs but different fixed entry costs—
where vertical integration leads to the non-entry of one of the upstream firms. 
  Thus if foreclosure effects are dominant, we should expect that vertical integration will 
be associated with higher prices, lower quantities of the downstream good, higher exit rates 
among unintegrated producers, and lower entry rates downstream and upstream.   
  Note that if vertical integration increases productive efficiency, we would instead expect 
lower prices and higher quantities of concrete.  However, one may still expect higher exit rates 
among unintegrated producers, if they do not benefit from the efficiency enhancements 
experienced by integrated rivals.  Entry rates may also be lower if the potential entrants are not 
efficient enough to survive in the market – though the opposite may be true if acquisition of 
existing downstream plants provides an avenue of entry and expansion by low cost producers in 
other markets (including cement producers who want to enter into the concrete business).  
  It is also reasonable to expect that foreclosure and efficiency effects could simultaneously 
operate in many market settings.  As detailed in the next two sections, our empirical analysis will 
address this by including explicit controls for plant-level productivity to look at the impact of 
integration on prices, quantities, entry, and exit, net of efficiency improvements.  We suspend 
until Section V the investigation into the logistics coordination mechanism that ties vertical 
integration to productivity. 
 
III. Data 
A. Plant-Level Ownership, Productivity, and Prices 
  The core of our analysis uses plant-level microdata from the 1963, 1967, 1972, 1977, 
1982, 1987, 1992, and 1997 Census of Manufactures (CM).  The CM is comprehensive; we 
  7observe every U.S. cement and ready-mixed concrete plant operating in the respective census 
years.  A typical CM has 220 cement and 5200 ready-mixed plants, though these relatively stable 
levels hide substantial gross plant entry and exit in both industries.  The CM microdata contain a 
wealth of information on plants’ production activities that we exploit below.  Crucially here, they 
also contain firm identification numbers for each plant.  (Plants, or “establishments” in Census 
Bureau terminology, are unique physical locations where products are made.  A firm can own 
one or more plants.)  Thus we are able to observe when a single firm owns plants in both 
industries, in which case we consider the firm and its component plants vertically integrated. 
  The comprehensiveness of the CM is extremely useful.  It allows us to observe each 
plant’s integration status in each census year, and because the CM contains permanent plant 
identifiers that are invariant to ownership changes, we can track changes in this status over time.  
Entry and exit of plants between census years are completely observable as well, allowing us to 
look at vertical integration’s long-run impact on markets. 
  Besides ownership information, the CM contains data on plant revenues, several labor 
input measures, book values of equipment and structures capital stocks, expenditures on inputs, 
and state and county codes.  We use this data directly and also to calculate other plant-level 
technology measures like labor and total factor productivity, measures of overhead labor, and 
capital-labor ratios.  Details of their construction are in the data appendix.  Further, for some 
ready-mixed concrete plants, we have access to auxiliary files containing the total value and the 
physical quantity of product shipments at a highly detailed (seven-digit SIC) level.  We can 
therefore measure plant output in either dollars or physical units (cubic yards, in this case), as 
well as calculate the plant’s average unit price (measured on a free-on-board basis and deflated 
to 1987 dollars using the industry-level price index from the NBER Productivity Database).
13
 
B. Local Markets in the Cement and Ready-Mixed Concrete Industries 
A useful attribute of the cement and ready-mixed industries as a forum for testing 
                                                 
13 Conveniently, most plants in the ready-mixed concrete industry are highly specialized; virtually all of their 
revenue—roughly 95 percent on average—comes from sales of ready-mixed, which is itself a seven-digit product.  
Other concrete products like block, pre-fabricated structural members, and pipe are typically made by producers in 
concrete industries other than SIC 3273.  Likewise, the amount of ready-mixed produced at these other industries’ 
plants is minuscule.  Unlike the ready-mixed industry, cement plants produce a number of seven-digit products 
(different cement types based on their chemical composition).  This makes cement plants’ average unit output prices 
more difficult to construct and less comparable across plants. 
  8foreclosure theory is that, due to the high transport costs inherent to the industries, they are 
comprised of many local markets.  This naturally raises the empirical issue of defining these 
markets.  We use different market definitions for cement and concrete because while transport 
costs are high in both industries, they are higher for concrete and shipment patterns reflect this. 
For ready-mixed concrete, we use the Component Economic Areas (CEAs) created by 
the Bureau of Economic Analysis.  CEAs are collections of counties usually, but not always, 
centered on Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs), and they are mutually exclusive and 
exhaustive of the land area of the United States.  The roughly 3200 U.S. counties are grouped 
into 348 such markets.  The procedures used to create CEAs ensure that counties in a given CEA 
are economically intertwined; see U.S. BEA (1995) for detailed information on their 
construction.  We believe that CEAs are well founded, albeit imperfect, market area measures for 
an industry where maximum ideal delivery distances are 30- to 45-minute drives from the plant.  
See Syverson (2004) for an extended discussion of the tradeoffs involved in defining ready-
mixed markets.  Since most, though not all, of the empirical exercises below deal with 
downstream markets, CEAs are the primary geographic demarcation used in the paper. 
For cement, with its lower transport costs, we use larger market areas.  Our primary 
market definition is that used by the U.S. Geological Survey in their Minerals Yearbook annual 
surveys of the industry (see USGS (2004), for example).  These 26 markets are essentially states 
or collections of states, with some states with particularly large numbers of cement plants 
(California, Pennsylvania, and Texas) split into separate markets.  This reflects an apparent 
USGS objective of roughly equating the number of plants across markets.  Due to our concern 
that this objective may sometimes get in the way of defining the true geographic markets present 
in the industry, in some specifications we use Economic Areas (EAs), which are aggregations of 
CEAs.
14  There are considerably more EAs (172) than USGS cement markets, and they are not 
beholden to the latter’s state-boundary or producer-equalization conditions. 
  Table 3 shows some summary measures of market structure for our geographic markets 
in both industries.  The average number of ready-mixed plants in a CEA market-year observation 
in our sample is 14.6, and the median is 10.  The largest market has 125 RMC plants.  The 
respective values for firm counts are 11.8, 8, and 110.  As suggested by the above discussion 
                                                 
14 While there are on average two CEAs per EA, larger and denser EAs typically have more CEAs than those in less 
populated areas.   For example, the Kansas City EA is comprised of the Kansas City (Kansas-Missouri), Lawrence 
(Kansas), and St. Joseph (Missouri) CEAs, while the Bangor (Maine) CEA is the only one in the Bangor EA.  
  9about the fraction of integrated ready-mixed plants, most markets are not integrated: the average 
number of integrated firms in a market is 0.3, and the median is zero (though certainly in the 
sample’s later years these values are higher).  Conditioning on at least one integrated firm 
operating in the concrete market, however, the average market share of integrated firms is 
substantial: 31.5 percent.  The median Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) for concrete markets 
in our sample is 2464.
15
For the USGS cement markets, the average number of plants is 8.3, the median 7, and the 
maximum 24.  A larger fraction of firms are vertically integrated: an average of 2.5 per market 
(of 7.1 firms total).  The median HHI is 2362.  The counts are of course lower (and the 
concentration numbers higher) for EAs, since these are notably smaller than USGS markets. 
  In most of the empirical tests below, we control for activity in the local construction 
sector (SICs 15-17), which buys the vast majority of the cement and concrete industries’ outputs.  
These demand measures are built from County Business Patterns employment data for the sector 
that we aggregate to the market level.  Total market demand (size) is measured simply as logged 
total construction employment, and market density is the (log of the) number of construction-
sector workers per square mile in the market.
16   
 
IV. The Extent of Integration and Market Power 
Our empirical approach is straightforward.  We compare patterns in the data to the 
predictions of foreclosure theory as well as the alternative explanation that increases in 
integration reflect the expansion of larger and more efficient producers.  Our ability to 
distinguish foreclosure from the alternative rests upon two key sets of implications.  First, 
foreclosure and productivity/efficiency theories have opposing predictions regarding the 
response of downstream prices and quantities to integration.  Second, while the two stories’ 
predictions for firm turnover are similar, foreclosure implies an effect of vertical integration per 
                                                 
15 We estimated some descriptive multivariate regressions to gauge the relationship between market structure and 
the extent of integration.  The market share of integrated firms is higher in more concentrated markets (as measured 
by HHI) as well as in those with high demand (i.e., larger markets; see below how we construct this demand 
measure from local construction activity data).  However, there is no clear relationship between integrated firms’ 
share of the local concrete market and concentration in the cement market in which the CEA is contained. 
16 As discussed in Syverson (2004 and forthcoming), construction activity is likely exogenous to the specifics of 
local concrete competition because while the construction sector accounts for virtually all ready-mixed sales, 
concrete’s cost share among the sector’s intermediate inputs is small.  Hence any changes in concrete prices should 
not by themselves create notable changes in the level of construction activity.  We expect that similar effects operate 
on a broader geographic scale in cement. 
  10se.  Productivity/efficiency explanations, on the other hand, imply that any observed effect of 
integration on turnover acts only inasmuch as productivity and integration are connected; hence 
integration’s effects should disappear once productivity is controlled for.
17
 
A. Does Vertical Integration Raise Prices? 
Foreclosure implies a positive relationship between downstream prices and the extent of 
vertical integration in a market, whereas an efficiency-based explanation for integration predicts 
a negative relationship.  As seen in Table 1 above, the basic patterns in the data are not consistent 
with foreclosure.  We now investigate if these market-level results hold up to deeper scrutiny.  
We first take advantage of our detailed plant-level data to see if there is a relation between 
vertical integration and prices among producers in the same market.  Next, we examine the 
efficiency and vertical integration link directly in plant-level productivity data.  Finally, we 
revisit the market-level evidence displayed in Table 1, this time using a richer set of controls, and 
paying more attention to potential endogeneity problems. 
 
A.1. Plant-Level Evidence 
We start our look at the plant-level relationship between downstream prices and vertical 
integration by regressing ready-mixed concrete plants’ (logged) prices on an indicator for the 
plant’s vertical integration status and a full set of market-year fixed effects.  The vertical 
integration dummy coefficient therefore captures the mean price difference across integrated and 
unintegrated producers in the same market and time period.  This specification is useful in that it 
compares producers who are facing the same market-level demand and supply conditions, which 
the market-level regressions in Table 1 do not fully control for. 
The results of this exercise are shown in column 1 of Table 4.  On average, integrated 
producers charge prices 2.2 percent lower than do their unintegrated competitors in the same 
                                                 
17 A third distinguishing implication of foreclosure models is that unintegrated downstream producers face higher 
input costs.  We can in principle test this in our data, because a subset of CM plants answer questions regarding their 
total expenditures on and purchased quantities of detailed intermediate inputs, allowing us to compute unit cement 
prices paid by concrete producers.  When we do so, we find that, rather than unintegrated concrete producers 
reporting higher cement input prices, there are no significant differences across integrated and unintegrated plants.  
While on its face this is not what is suggested by foreclosure, it is far from clear what the reported cement prices 
from integrated concrete makers reflect.  The Census Bureau instructs establishments to report the value of internal 
materials transfers, “at their full economic value (the value assigned by the shipping plant, plus the cost of freight 
and other handling charges).”  It is possible that these results simply reflect integrated plants “marking to the 
market” their internal transfer prices. 
  11market.  Thus the negative relationship between downstream prices and integration seen across 
markets also holds even among producers within them. 
We further investigate these plant level patterns with several additional comparisons, 
again all within the same market-year.  Column 5 of the table compares price growth rates 
among continuing plants (i.e., those that operated in both the previous and current CMs) that 
were unintegrated in the previous CM.  The vertical integration indicator in this case takes a 
value of one if a plant became integrated between the previous and current CMs.  The estimated 
coefficient implies that these newly integrated plants have somewhat—1.1 percent—more 
positive price changes than their cohorts that remain unintegrated, but the difference is not 
statistically significant.  Columns 9 and 13 contrast the prices of integrated entrants (entrants are 
defined as plants appearing for the first time in the current CM) to unintegrated entrants and 
unintegrated incumbents, respectively.  As with the comparison in the first column, integrated 
producers charge lower prices than the unintegrated comparison groups.  Integrated firms’ new 
plants price 3.7 percent below new plants of unintegrated firms and 2.3 percent below integrated 
incumbents (though this last difference is only marginally significant, with a p-value of 0.07).  
Integrated producers’ lower prices thus arise not because formerly unintegrated existing plants 
see large price drops upon becoming integrated, but instead because newly built integrated plants 
tend to charge lower prices, and this difference persists over time. 
To get at the source of integrated plants’ lower prices, we introduce two additional 
controls into each of the four plant-level price comparisons above.  These are a dummy 
indicating if a plant is owned by a multi-unit firm, and the plant’s total factor productivity (TFP) 
level.  The multi-unit dummy captures, in a rough measure, the size of the firm that owns the 
plant.  Recall from the discussion in Section II that all vertically integrated plants are in multi-
plant firms, but non-vertical organizational structures meet this condition as well, so when we 
include the multi-unit indicator in a specification, the vertical integration coefficient reflects 
differences between integrated plants and other plants in multi-unit firms without cement 
operations.  The TFP measure reflects a producer’s efficiency; in other words, the inverse of its 
cost level.  We use a physical TFP measure—that is, the output measure in the TFP index is the 
physical output of the plant—rather than the literature-standard revenue-based output measure.  
As Foster, Haltiwanger, and Syverson (2005) discuss, the latter attributes price differences across 
industry plants to output differences.  This is something one would like to avoid, and we can do 
  12so since we can measure the actual cubic yards of concrete that plants ship. 
The remaining columns of Table 4 show each of the four plant-level price comparisons 
with the multi-unit status dummy and physical TFP measure included in the specifications, first 
separately and then together.
18  Controlling for a plant’s multi-unit status explains some of the 
price difference between plants within a market, to the point of making the vertical integration 
indicator insignificant in the comparison of entering plants’ prices, but prices of vertically 
integrated plants remain significantly lower than other multi-unit plants in the broadest 
comparison.  More starkly, TFP always enters negatively into the regressions and reduces the 
magnitude and eliminates the statistical significance of the VI indicator.  These results suggest 
vertically integrated producers charge lower prices because to some degree all plants in multi-
unit firms do, but especially because they have higher productivity levels.
19
 
A.2. Are Integrated Plants More Productive? 
To look at the productivity-integration relationship more closely, we repeat the four sets 
of comparisons above, except we replace prices with plants’ TFP levels.
20  (Again all 
specifications include CEA-year fixed effects, so results reflect variation among plants in the 
same market-year.)  The results are shown in Table 5.  Column 1 indicates vertically integrated 
plants have TFP levels that are 4.3 percent higher on average than their unintegrated competitors.  
In other words, they produce 104.3 cubic yards of ready-mixed concrete from the same inputs 
that unintegrated producers in the same market use to produce 100 cubic yards.  Comparing TFP 
changes among formerly unintegrated plants in column 2 shows that plants that become 
integrated see roughly 10 percent faster productivity growth, though this difference is only 
marginally statistically significant.  Similar TFP gaps to those in the entire sample are observed 
when restricting the comparison to between integrated entrants and either unintegrated entrants 
                                                 
18 The smaller number of observations in the specifications including plant TFP is due to the fact that capital stocks, 
which we need to construct a TFP measure, were not available in the 1967 CM while price data was. 
19 The fact that we construct plant-level prices as the ratio of reported revenues to physical quantities means that if 
there is measurement error in quantities, this will create a negative correlation between measured prices and 
quantities (and by implication, TFP as well).  This could potentially lead to these specifications overstating the 
actual correlation between prices and productivity levels.  However, work in Syverson (forthcoming) and Foster, 
Haltiwanger, and Syverson (2005) indicates that the negative relationship is not a spurious result driven by 
measurement error.  Further, as we show below, the negative price-productivity correlation also holds for market-
level averages, where the averaging process should lessen any influence of measurement error.  
20 We will explore the connection between vertical integration and firm size in detail below. 
  13or incumbents.  The significance of these differences is weaker, however, likely due in part to the 
reduced sample sizes. 
These patterns are consistent with the alternative explanation to foreclosure forwarded 
above: namely, that increases in integration reflect expansion of more efficient producers.  Their 
lower costs drive down average market prices directly, because they have lower costs and can 
charge less, but also indirectly, by reducing their competitors’ optimal prices in equilibrium. 
 
A.3. Market-Level Evidence Revisited 
With these plant-level findings in hand, we now revisit market-level analyses of the types 
shown in Table 1.  We check the robustness of these earlier results by adding more controls.  We 
include the HHI concentration measure of the CEA-year observation to control for the horizontal 
structure of the local concrete market.  As discussed above, the extent of vertical integration in 
the downstream market is related to downstream (though not upstream) concentration.  
Controlling for this correlation lets us see the vertical integration-price relationship that is 
orthogonal to any changes in horizontal concentration.  We also control for demand density 
(described above) in the local market; Syverson (forthcoming) shows how it impacts average 
prices through competition-driven selection and markups.  We cluster standard errors by CEA 
market to account for any temporal correlation in unobservables. 
  The results are shown in Panel A of Table 6.  Columns 1, 2, 6, and 7 repeat the market-
level price specifications from Table 1 (for both extent-of-integration measures) while including 
the additional controls.  Just as in Table 1, more integrated concrete markets have lower average 
prices.
21  The magnitudes of the coefficients track the earlier values, though the specifications 
that include market fixed effects have smaller estimates that in one case become insignificant.
22  
The implied average price differences are substantial.  For example, column 1 implies that going 
                                                 
21 For space and clarity reasons, we do not report the HHI or demand density coefficients.  HHI typically enters 
positively, indicating that all else equal, higher concentration coincides with higher prices.  However it is usually not 
statistically significant and its economic magnitude is modest: a 2250-point increase in the HHI—the interquartile 
range—is associated with a roughly one percent increase in prices.  Density too is typically insignificant, except in 
the specification excluding market fixed effects, in which case it enters negatively.  It is positive and insignificant 
otherwise.  The sign switch is due to the fact that within-market changes in density actually reflect only changes in 
the level of demand, because market areas are fixed.  Ceteris paribus higher demand will raise prices in a market. 
22 The smaller coefficients with market fixed effects could result either because there are market unobservables 
correlated positively with vertical integration and negatively with prices (more on this below), or because 
attenuation bias from measurement error (say if our market definitions imperfectly capture the true geographic 
markets) is exacerbated when we identify vertical integration effects only from within-market changes. 
  14from a market with no integrated producers to one where integrated firms hold a market share of 
0.315 (the average share conditional upon at least one VI producer being in a market) 
corresponds to a four percent decline in the average ready-mixed price.  Likewise, the coefficient 
in column 6 indicates that an additional integrated firm operating in a market corresponds to a 
roughly 3 percent drop in average prices.  These estimated magnitudes are roughly 25 to 35 
percent of the between-market standard deviation in average prices of 10.2 percent. 
As suggested by the plant-level analyses above, we investigate how controlling for multi-
unit status and TFP affects the price-integration relationship.  For market-level controls 
analogous to those above, we use the market share (or number of) multi-plant firms and the 
quantity-weighted average TFP in the market.  Again we add each control separately to the 
regressions, then control for them simultaneously.  The results are in columns 3-5 and 8-10 
(again the sample size falls because we cannot measure TFP in the 1967 CM). 
The results are similar to those in the plant-level analyses above.  The market share or 
number of multi-unit firms enters negatively and slightly reduces the estimated impact of vertical 
integration, but the greatest impact is found when average TFP in the market is included in the 
specification.  The average TFP coefficients are negative; intuitively, growth in the average 
productivity of a market’s producers is associated with declining average prices.  Our TFP 
control does therefore seem to capture efficiency effects on market outcomes.  Moreover, the 
coefficients on the extent-of-integration measures remain negative, but shrink in size and become 
insignificant.  Hence if changes in average TFP sufficiently capture the efficiency gains that 
accompany vertical integration, the results suggest the remaining price effects of integration are 
essentially zero.  These results suggest two inferences.  First, any impact of the extent of vertical 
integration in a market appears to be driven by the increase in average productivity levels among 
market producers rather than something tied to integration per se.  Second, it does not appear that 
efficiency gains from vertical mergers or other unobservables are simply hiding foreclosure 
effects in the raw data.  Once we control for the change in average efficiency, we still do not see 
a positive impact of integration on prices. 
These results are not on their face consistent with the positive relationship between prices 
and integration implied by foreclosure.  Of course, the decision to vertically integrate is a choice 
made by firms, and the extent of integration is not random across our sample.  Perhaps 
integration does facilitate foreclosure, but there are market-specific unobservables correlated 
  15with both higher integration intensity and lower prices.  We make a few observations on this 
point.  First, any unobservables would have to have particularly strong correlations with higher 
integration intensity and lower prices to swamp the positive price effects of foreclosure, as the 
observed net integration-price correlations are substantially negative.  Second, it is unclear what 
the candidates for such unobservables might be.  Suppose the price drops are driven by 
unobservable inward shifts in market demand (and recall that we are already controlling for 
demand density, which is positively correlated with demand across markets and whose growth 
within markets equals demand growth since areas are fixed).  If so, these unobservable demand 
contractions would have to induce large, expanding firms—which, as we will discuss later, aptly 
describes integrated firms in our sample—to prefer integrating into such markets.  But one 
typically expects entry and expansion to follow positive demand shocks, not negative ones.  
Nonetheless, possible endogeneity concerns should be minimized to the greatest extent possible 
given the data.  Including market fixed effects goes some distance in this direction, since it 
removes any market-level influences on prices and the extent of integration that are fixed over 
time.  However, we take additional approaches toward this end.  These are discussed below.
23
Our first approach uses variation in antitrust authorities’ enforcement regimes (some of 
which we discussed briefly above in Section II) and spatial demand patterns within markets to 
instrument for market structure.  For the sake of brevity, we detail the construction of the 
instrument set in the Data Appendix, but their logic can be summarized succinctly.  The antitrust 
enforcement instruments use the stated policy rules of the U.S. antitrust agencies (both the FTC 
and the Department of Justice) to identify instances in which the mechanical nature of the rules 
create plausibly exogenous variation in the extent of antitrust scrutiny across our sample markets, 
either in cross section or over time.  These policies include rules applied both economy-wide and 
specifically to the cement and ready-mixed industries.  The spatial demand instruments work off 
the facts that construction activity should be exogenous to ready-mixed market outcomes due to 
concrete’s small share in construction costs (as discussed above), and that demand variation 
across areas within a given market plausibly impacts the returns to a firm owning multiple 
concrete plants.  Both the antitrust policy and spatial demand instruments should have 
explanatory power over firms’ preferred organizational structures within and across markets—
                                                 
23 Vertical integration is not the only market-structure attribute that is endogenous: the market share of multi-unit 
firms and concentration reflected in the HHI are as well.  Our methods also attempt to address this endogeneity. 
  16i.e., whether they are multi-unit and/or vertically integrated, and how large of a market share 
they can have within a given market—and be orthogonal to other local demand or supply shocks.  
The first-stage results, not reported here, indicate that interactions of firm and market structures, 
and the extent of vertical integration in a market in particular, are related to the instruments in the 
expected ways.  For example, the extent of integration in concrete markets with a larger share of 
firms specifically marked by the FTC for merger scrutiny is lower during the years in which this 
policy was in force. 
The results of the instrumented specification are shown 1 through 4 of Table 6, Panel B.  
(All specifications control for demand, downstream HHI, and market fixed effects.)  The implied 
impact of vertical integration on prices is negative, as with the benchmark results above.  
Moreover, the magnitude of the implied relationship between integration and prices is larger than 
in Panel A of Table 6 (in the fully saturated specification, moving a market from integrated firms 
having zero market share to having a 31.5 percent share implies a 25 percent drop in average 
price).  We note, however, that the standard errors are much larger here than in the benchmark 
specification.  This lack of precision, which is even more pronounced in our market level 
quantity regressions discussed in Section IV.B below, may be due to the fact that our instruments 
have difficulty predicting changes in vertical integration that are orthogonal to changes in 
horizontal structure (as captured by the share of multi-unit firms and market HHI).
24
Another approach to address endogeneity concerns estimates price effects using the 
subsample of CEA-years involved in multi-market mergers.  The idea, as with Hastings and 
Gilbert (2005), is to identify integration’s impacts using arguably random variation in the extent 
of integration across the several markets that experience a single-firm merger.  For example, 
consider the simple case of a cement firm integrating by purchasing a concrete firm that owns 
two plants, each operating in a different market.  One plant has a market share of 20 percent in 
its local market, the other a 30 percent share.  If the cement firm’s decision to integrate with this 
particular downstream firm was made based on considerations of the target firm as a whole 
rather than in its specific markets, differences in the extent of integration due to the merger—
                                                 
24 As pointed out by Shea (1997), in the presence of multiple endogenous variables in a specification, instruments 
need not just be relevant to each endogenous variable, they must have linearly independent relevance to each.  We 
constructed the R
2 relevance statistics Shea (1997) suggests to measure this and found, indeed, that after accounting 
for the market share of multi-unit firms and market HHI (two other endogenous variables), the instruments did not 
have a high degree of little explanatory power over the market share of vertically integrated producers. This suggests 
caution in interpreting the results from this specification, particularly with regard to the validity of the standard 
errors, even though the instruments pass the commonly used F-test in the first-stage. 
  17integrated firms’ market share will grow 10 percentage points more in the second market than in 
the first—will be exogenous to market-specific outcomes.  Hastings and Gilbert use this type of 
variation from a particular merger in the wholesale gasoline industry that impacted 14 markets.  
While most of the multi-market mergers in our sample involve fewer markets, we observe not 
one but many such mergers during our observation period. 
We define a multiple-market merger as having occurred if a single firm newly integrates 
plants in two or more markets during the same inter-CM period.  This happened 29 times in our 
sample, each merger involving an average of just under five markets, giving us a sample of 142 
market-years with which to estimate vertical integration’s effects.  We run the price regressions 
as before on this subsample but now include merger fixed effects in the regressions.  Thus all the 
variation in VI intensity used to identify integration’s impact comes from across-market variation 
within particular merger episodes.  Referring back to the example above, the specification uses 
the fact that the market-share vertical integration measure was 10 percentage points higher in the 
second market than in the first and compares this to the difference in average prices between the 
two markets. 
The results using the sample of multi-market merger episodes are shown in columns 5 
through 8 of Panel B.  Again all specifications control for the market demand and HHI, though 
these coefficients are not reported.  A higher market share of vertically integrated firms 
corresponds to lower prices.  (Similar results, not reported here, are obtained when using the 
number of vertically integrated firms to measure the extent of integration in the market.)  The 
magnitude of the VI coefficient is notably similar to the benchmark specification.
25  When we 
add controls for the share of multi-unit firms and the average TFP in the market, we also find 
results similar to those above.  The multi-unit share is negatively (albeit weakly) related to 
average prices and explains part of the correlation between VI and prices.  Average TFP is also 
associated with lower prices (we lose 9 CEA-year markets and 4 merger episodes in the smaller 
sample), and including it makes the extent of integration measure insignificant.  When we 
control for both multi-unit share and average TFP, integration is negatively but insignificantly 
                                                 
25 Recall that the exogeneity argument here is that firms make merger decisions on a whole-firm basis, not on the 
expected market structure change in any particular market they are merging into.  Obviously we cannot test this 
proposition directly.  However, arguments that particular market outcomes are the primary concern would have to 
explain, as is implied by the results, why the merging firms choose to most intensively enter markets with 
idiosyncratically low prices. 
  18connected to average prices. 
Our third approach to address possible endogeneity is to add state-year fixed effects to 
our benchmark specification.  These control for any state-specific unobserved demand or supply 
shocks that might be correlated with the extent of integration and average prices.  One example 
of such shocks would be local government construction spending that for one reason or another 
is not reflected in our construction employment (demand) measure.  Note that we still include 
CEA effects as well; in effect, the specification identifies vertical integration’s impact from 
intertemporal price and integration variations across different CEAs in the same state.
26
The results are in columns 9-12 of Panel B.  Not surprisingly, the reduced variation we 
have to estimate the link between integration and prices leads to less statistical significance; in 
no case does the vertical integration coefficient have a p-value below 0.11.  However, the 
qualitative features of the results echo those seen in the benchmark.  Vertical integration is 
negatively related to average concrete prices, as are the share of multi-unit plants and the average 
TFP level in the market, though only the latter is significantly so.  This is again consistent with 
efficiency effects driving the negative relationship between prices and the extent of integration. 
On whole, the many results presented in this section do not point to foreclosure-driven 
price increases.  Instead, vertical integration is associated with lower prices both at the plant and 
market level.  We do find evidence that this negative relationship is not driven by vertical 
integration per se, but rather because vertical integration is tied to larger, more productive firms.  
This is consistent with the alternative efficiency-based explanation of the observed patterns in 
the data.  We will discuss in Section V why vertical integration, productivity, and firm size might 
be linked in these industries. 
 
B. Does Vertical Integration Reduce Quantities? 
We use specifications similar to those above to investigate how vertical integration 
impacts market quantities. 
We start again by documenting the plant-level patterns.  Table 7 repeats the comparisons 
                                                 
26 A measurement issue arises here because states do not completely nest every CEA (recall CEA boundaries need 
not coincide with state boundaries).  To implement this empirical specification, we have to assign a “primary” state 
to each CEA that is not wholly contained within one state.  We do so by counting the number of counties of each 
state in every multi-state CEA, and assigning the primary state designation to the state with the most counties.  In 
the few cases where the maximum counts were equal, the state with the primary influence was apparent because it 
had a large metropolitan area in the CEA.  The state-year dummies were constructed by interacting year effects with 
either this “modal-state” designation for multi-state CEAs or the unique state containing the other CEAs.  
  19of Table 4, except using plants’ physical outputs (logged cubic yards of ready-mixed concrete).  
Column 1 shows that integrated ready-mixed producers make considerably more output than do 
their unintegrated competitors in the same market.  However, as seen in column 5, the output of 
ready-mixed plants that become integrated actually shrinks (some 18 percent) relative to 
unintegrated continuers.  This is counterbalanced, though, by the building of new plants by the 
integrated firm; as can be seen in the estimates in column 9, new integrated plants are larger than 
plants of unintegrated producers.
27
When we add controls for multi-unit status and the plant’s TFP, both are associated with 
higher plant output, with multi-unit status sometimes statistically significant and TFP always so.  
Further, in both the overall and entrant-only comparisons, their inclusion reduces the implied 
quantity impact of vertical integration.  This is qualitatively similar to their effect in the price 
comparisons above.  In the broadest comparison (column 4), however, there is still a statistically 
distinct quantity difference between vertically integrated plants and other multi-unit plants, even 
controlling for TFP.  Including the controls has little impact on how much newly integrated 
firms’ outputs fall relative to plants that remain unintegrated, even though productivity gains are 
strongly correlated with output growth (column 8). 
For the market-level analysis, we replace the weighted average price as the dependent 
variable with the total (logged) physical quantity of ready-mixed concrete sold in the market.
28  
Just as with the market-level price regressions, we control for year effects, the market’s HHI, and 
local demand as measured by logged construction employment (levels rather than density here).  
Again we do not report these coefficients for space reasons; HHI is significantly negative and 
demand, not surprisingly, significantly positive in every specification.  As with the price 
                                                 
27 Note that there is a less direct connection between plant- and market-level outcomes in quantity terms than with 
prices.  Firms’ total quantities produced in a market can change either intensively, through the amount produced by 
individual plants, or extensively, with the number of plants the firm owns.  The expected output change due to a new 
integrated firm entering a market depends on the size of the output reductions at its newly acquired plants relative to 
the output added by its newly built plants.  In our sample, the net revenue changes when a new vertically integrated 
firm comes into a market are on average positive.  This is consistent with the market-level evidence below.  We 
discuss further in Section V why an integrated producer might, in the same market over the same period, purchase 
and shrink existing plants while also building new ones. 
28 Here we must be particularly careful with regard to measurement issues.  Because the CM product supplement 
does not cover all plants, we cannot directly calculate total market quantity simply by aggregating plants’ reported 
quantities.  We therefore use plant revenue instead.  Yet revenue data alone is problematic because it incorporates 
price variation across plants: because our price deflator is not market specific, unadjusted revenue overstates 
(understates) output in markets with higher (lower) than average prices.  Our solution is to measure total quantity in 
a market as market revenue divided by the market’s quantity-weighted average price that we use above. 
  20regressions, we estimate several specifications that include our benchmark estimations and those 
that address possible endogeneity of firm and market structure. 
  The results are presented in Panels A and B of Table 8.  In the benchmark specifications 
in Panel A, greater vertical integration measured by either the market share or number of 
vertically integrated firms is associated with higher output levels in the local concrete market.  
This again reflects the patterns seen in Table 1.  This is true in the cross section, as seen in 
columns 1 and 6, and within markets over time, as in columns 2 and 7.  The estimates imply that 
going from a completely unintegrated market to where integrated firms have a 31.5 percent share 
implies a rise in total quantities sold of roughly 10 percent.  Alternatively, going from 0 to 1 
vertically integrated firm in the concrete market corresponds to a quantity increase of about 12 
percent.
29  Similar patterns are seen in response to changes in integration within markets.  
Columns 3 and 4 of the table show the results when market fixed effects are included.  Output 
increases significantly when a market becomes more integrated. 
  When we control for the market share (or number) of multi-unit firms and the quantity-
weighted average TFP in the market, again we see, as with the market-level price tests above, 
that these measures explain the link between market outcome and the extent of vertical 
integration.  The multi-unit measure always enters as significantly positive and substantially 
reduces the magnitude of the coefficient on the extent of integration measure.  Average TFP 
follows the same pattern.  When included together, these controls drive the coefficient on the VI 
measure essentially to zero.  Unlike the average price results, where average TFP explained most 
of the relationship between integration and prices, both multi-unit firms and average TFP have 
independent, significant correlations with total market quantities. 
In the robustness checks in Panel B, we obtain a positive point estimate of the effect of 
vertical integration on total market quantities in all but one of the specifications. We also find as 
in Panel A that adding the TFP and multi-unit controls reduces the point estimate on vertical 
                                                 
29 We note that the above argument that market-level construction activity is likely exogenous to concrete prices is 
still consistent with a nonzero quantity response to changes in concrete prices.  To see why, note that the exogeneity 
argument implies that the derivative of construction output with respect to concrete prices is roughly zero.  This 
derivative can be restated as the product of two derivatives: construction output with respect to concrete output, and 
concrete output with respect to concrete prices.  Thus even when the latter is nonzero (that is, concrete quantities are 
responsive to concrete prices), the total derivative is roughly zero if the former derivative is small enough.  This 
former derivative is determined by the construction sector’s production function.  The very small cost share of 
concrete in total construction costs (around two percent in the Benchmark Input-Output tables) suggests that this 
derivative is in fact quite small. 
  21integration.  Statistical significance, however, is obtained less readily.  The antitrust enforcement 
and spatial demand instrumentation strategy yields imprecise point estimates (see the discussion 
above).  In the multi-market merger specification, while the coefficients on the extent of 
integration measure are all positive of similarly sized to the benchmark results, they are not 
significant.  (The multi-market merger specifications that used the number of vertically 
integrated firms to measure the extent of integration, not reported here for brevity, did yield 
significantly positive estimated impacts in the regression without MU and TFP controls.  The 
estimates also become smaller and insignificant once we added these controls.)  Finally, the 
specifications that control for state-year fixed effects follow the benchmark results quite closely, 
qualitatively and quantitatively. 
In sum, these quantity tests, as with the price tests above, give no indication that vertical 
integration in the cement and ready-mixed industries facilitates the exercise of market power.  
Vertically integrated plants sell more and charge lower prices on average than their unintegrated 
competitors in the same markets.  The net quantity impact of the entry of a vertically integrated 
firm into a market is positive because the decline in output from acquired plants is compensated 
by additional output from newly built plants.  Furthermore, at the market level, increases in the 
extent of integration in a market are associated with greater total quantities sold.  As with the 
price results, any such vertical integration effect does not seem attributable to vertical integration 
itself, but rather to concomitant increases in the presence of larger, more efficient firms in the 
market.  (This, as we will detail below, appears to arise because such firms are able to harness 
logistical efficiencies.)  There is also no evidence that foreclosure impacts exist but are simply 
being empirically swamped by efficiency gains. 
 
C. Do Integration’s Effects Differ across Markets with Different Ex Ante Foreclosure Potential? 
The tests above assume vertical integration has common price and quantity implications 
for all markets.  However, the model exposited earlier suggests foreclosure potential may be 
linked to upstream and downstream market structure.  The upstream firm’s ability to leverage 
market power gains by integrating depends in part on the extent of its pre-integration market 
power.  Further, the heightened vertical antitrust enforcement regime during part of our sample 
may also have limited upstream producers’ foreclosure abilities during that period.  We test in 
this section whether there are noticeable differences in price and quantity effects across four 
  22types of markets that theory suggests offer greater ex ante foreclosure potential. 
  The first specification takes the model’s polar case quite literally.  It tests whether price 
and quantity impacts are systematically different in ready-mixed markets that are both a) served 
by a single, vertically integrated cement firm, and b) have a small number of ready-mixed 
firms—specifically, less than five.  Market power gains are presumably largest in these markets 
since unintegrated ready-mixed producers are more vulnerable to being foreclosed.  The second 
specification is a looser version of this cement monopoly test.  We allow the integration 
coefficients to differ depending on whether the local cement-industry HHI is above or below its 
mean value in our sample.
30  The third variation allows differential impacts in markets where 
cement imports, the availability of which could limit foreclosure power, are less likely to be a 
viable alternative for cement buyers.  We consider imports to be most easily available in EAs 
containing a port that was one of the 25 largest reception points for imported cement (using 2002 
data from the U.S. Customs Service) and if the year was 1977 or later, since before that time 
cement imports were a trivial share of national consumption.
31  Our fourth and final market 
breakdown takes advantage of the antitrust enforcement policy variation discussed above and 
allows different price and quantity effects during CM years other than 1967, 1972, and 1977, the 
period of the strictest stance toward vertical mergers by U.S. antitrust authorities.  If enforcement 
or potential enforcement limits foreclosure possibilities, we should be more likely to see 
foreclosure-type price and quantity responses during the lax enforcement period. 
  Table 9 shows the results of this exercise.  Each set of estimates was obtained using the 
benchmark specification and sample of the previous two sections, except here the price and 
quantity effects are allowed to vary depending upon whether or not one of the conditions above 
is met.  The “interacted” markets in each specification are chosen so that foreclosure effects 
                                                 
30 For these two specifications we consider cement plants’ service areas to be BEA Economic Areas (described 
above) rather than the much larger USGS cement markets.  Cement monopolies are very rare in the USGS markets 
due to the way they are constructed, and furthermore the model’s assumed transport-cost driven advantage of local 
cement monopolists is likely to be much stronger when considered within the smaller market definition.  We also 
realize that the upstream market structure measures used here are themselves endogenous outcomes that might have 
been influenced by the vertical structure itself rather than simply capturing pre-existing conditions.  However, the 
variation in foreclosure potential across markets in our two other specifications below is essentially exogenous. 
31 While imported cement may not always be consumed in the market where it is brought to port, the fraction moved 
to other markets is likely to be small.  Land transport of cement is expensive relative to its value, and “ports” in the 
Customs data include interior cities on navigable waterways, such as St. Louis, Minneapolis, and Cleveland.  One 
possible factor that would counteract the ability of cement consumers to substitute to imports is if most cement 
imports are comprised of clinker (cement in an intermediate, post-kiln, pellet-like stage) that is purchased and then 
ground into cement and sold by domestic cement firms.  Unfortunately the data does not reveal importers’ identities. 
  23should be more likely in those markets than in the remainder of the sample.
32
When integration coefficients are allowed to differ in markets with vertically integrated 
monopolist cement firms and few ready-mixed firms (columns 1 and 2), the implied price effects 
are not significantly different in these markets than in the rest of the sample.  The negative price-
integration and positive quantity-integration relationships remain even in these markets that most 
closely match the polar case of the model above.  (Both of their magnitudes are about 20 percent 
smaller than in the rest of the sample, but the differences are insignificant.)  When this 
comparison is broadened to all markets with above-average cement HHIs, again there are no 
statistically significant differences in the price- and quantity-integration correlations.  However, 
a combination of the magnitude of the interaction terms and their imprecision leads to the 
implied price and quantity effects of vertical integration being insignificant—and in the case of 
quantities, considerably smaller in size—in markets with high cement HHIs.  In the third set of 
interactions, markets where importing cement is unlikely to be an option still see negative 
(positive) and significant associations between average prices (total quantities) and the share of 
vertically integrated firms.  The magnitudes of the coefficients are slightly larger in no-import 
markets, but again the differences are insignificant.  Finally, when we allow differential price 
and quantity effects during periods of lax antitrust policy attitudes toward vertical mergers, we 
do not see foreclosure’s implications surfacing in these periods.  The relationships between 
market-level outcomes and the extent of integration remain the same in these years as during the 
tougher enforcement regime.  The implied price effect is slightly larger, the quantity effect 
slightly smaller, but neither significantly so.  
Therefore in final goods markets that theory indicates are a priori more susceptible to 
foreclosure, we still see a negative correlation between integration and prices and a positive 
correlation between integration and quantities.  In none of the specifications is the magnitude of 
the negative price-integration relationship statistically different in “high foreclosure potential” 
markets from the remainder of the sample.  In three of four specifications, integration does 
appear to be associated with a smaller (though still positive) quantity gains in such markets, but 
this difference is statistically weak. 
                                                 
32 Here we use the specification without market fixed effects to highlight differences across markets with differing 
foreclosure potential.  All specifications control for the HHI in the ready-mixed concrete market, demand density 
(price regressions) or demand (quantity regressions), and year effects.  Only specifications using the market share 
measure of the extent of vertical integration are shown for space reasons, though similar results are obtained using 
the number of integrated firms. 
  24 
D. Does Vertical Integration Force Exit of Unintegrated Producers? 
Foreclosure models predict that firms can use leverage afforded by vertical integration to 
force unintegrated rivals out of business in both the upstream and downstream industries.  We 
test this implication in this section. 
The first test directly compares exit probabilities across integrated and unintegrated 
producers.  We regress an indicator for plant death by the next census (i.e., it does not exist in the 
following CM) on an integration status indicator as well as a full set of market-year fixed 
effects.
33
Panel A of Table 10 contains the results for both concrete and cement plants.  Integrated 
plants in both industries are less likely to exit than their unintegrated competitors in the same 
market-year.  The implied differences are nontrivial; integrated concrete plants have a 5.3 
percentage point lower probability of exit over a five-year inter-census period and an 8.3 
percentage point lower probability in cement.  As points of comparison, the unconditional inter-
census exit rates across all plants are 30.3 percent in ready-mixed concrete and 16.4 percent in 
cement.  Unlike the price and quantity results, these exit patterns are consistent with foreclosure. 
We add the multi-unit indicator and plant TFP controls as shown in columns 2-4 and 6-
8.
34  Both are negatively correlated with exit in both industries.  Interestingly, here multi-unit 
status has greater influence on the vertical integration coefficient than does TFP.  It is significant 
in every specification, and controlling for it alone is enough to make vertical integration’s 
correlation with exit fall to zero in both industries.  When we control for both factors 
simultaneously, the vertical integration indicators for both concrete and cement plants remain 
statistically insignificant and have small magnitudes. 
So again we see controlling for multi-unit status and TFP explains away any impact of 
vertical integration not connected to size or productivity.  Vertically integrated plants are more 
likely to survive not because of any particular facet of being integrated, but instead because they 
                                                 
33 We do not count as exits plants that leave the cement or concrete industries but continue to operate in a different 
industry.  The exits with which we concern ourselves—complete disappearances of plants from the CM universe—
correspond to the cessation of economic activity at the former plant’s location.  We have also run probit exit models 
and found similar results to those reported here. 
34 Note that in these regressions, we use revenue-based TFP rather than the physical-output-based measure used 
above, as we do not have physical output for cement plants.  Moreover, revenue-based TFP may be the better 
control variable here, as it captures both technology and demand fundamentals, both of which affect survival. 
  25are in large firms and have higher productivity levels.  This is inconsistent with foreclosure, 
which implies integration itself has a survival benefit.  A productivity-based story of vertical 
merger effects, on the other hand, does not predict a differential impact of integration except 
through its correlation with productivity and size.
35
We next look at how market-level vertical integration affects exit of unintegrated 
producers.  We regress the exit rate of unintegrated producers in a market on the extent of 
integration, controlling for market and year fixed effects, the industry’s HHI in the local market, 
and demand growth between the present and future CM.
36  The results are in Panel B of Table 5. 
The extent of integration is positively related to unintegrated producers’ exit rates in both 
industries, reflecting in part the across-plant exit likelihood differences seen above.  However, 
the link here is statistically insignificant and economically small: in concrete (cement), raising 
the market share of vertically integrated producers from zero to one—i.e., across the extremes of 
the data—implies only a 3.3 (8.4) percentage point increase in the exit rate of unintegrated 
producers.  This is a fraction of the average plant-level exit rates above, especially for concrete.  
Controlling for multi-unit status and average TFP in the market makes little difference in the 
estimate of the vertical integration coefficient and the controls themselves have insignificant 
impacts on exit rates; we suppress these results for space reasons. 
We see that, as foreclosure predicts, being vertically integrated is correlated with a lower 
exit probability for a plant in either industry.  However, this relationship is driven by the fact that 
integrated plants are in larger firms and have higher productivity levels.  Once this is controlled 
for, there is no longer a per se survival benefit of vertical integration.  Further, increases in the 
extent of integration within a market do not lead to significantly higher exit rates among 
unintegrated producers in that market. 
                                                 
35 These results are consistent with earlier empirical evidence.  Many studies have found more productive plants are 
less likely to exit.  See, for example, Baily, Hulten, and Campbell (1992); Olley and Pakes (1996); Aw, Chen, and 
Roberts (2001); and several of the papers reviewed in Bartelsman and Doms (2000).  Further, a separate benefit of 
size for survival was observed in Dunne, Roberts, and Samuelson (1989), perhaps due to larger firms having greater 
ability to raise financial capital internally, or because firm size acts as a sort of “permanent TFP” proxy for the firm, 
capturing the long-run component of productivity that is conflated with noise in the contemporaneous measure.   
36 For the sake of symmetry with our entry rate analysis below, we construct the market-level exit rate by dividing 
the number of exiting unintegrated plants by the average number of unintegrated plants in the market in the current 
and future CM, rather than just the count in the current period.  For small percentage changes both measures are 
closely comparable.  We also weight observations by market demand so as to not give undue influence to markets 
with very small numbers of plants, where even a single plant exit can create a large exit rate.  We do not report 
coefficients on the controls for space reasons; concrete HHI is negatively related to exit rates but the results are 
otherwise unremarkable. 
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E. Does Vertical Integration Reduce Entry? 
  Many foreclosure models, as well as the FTC report on cement-concrete integration, 
imply that vertical mergers can lead to higher entry barriers.  This prediction has strong 
implications for long-run welfare, as giving firms the ability to preserve their market power by 
restricting the entry of new competitors is socially harmful.  We explore the link between entry 
and vertical integration here. 
  We compute two types of entry rates for each market.  One is plant-based and is 
calculated by dividing the number of new plants in the market by the average number of plants 
over the current and previous CM.
37  The second entry rate is firm-based.  Here definition issues 
are more complex.  Unlike plants, which are geographically unique, firms can operate in several 
markets.  We must therefore take a stand on how to treat entry of existing firms into new 
geographic markets.  For example, if a company that has operated in Texas for fifteen years 
builds a plant in Ohio, is that entry?  We consider it as such because of the highly geographically 
segmented nature of these industries’ product markets.  Note that not only could this entry occur 
by the firm building a new plant, but also by its purchase of an existing one.  That is, a market 
could experience firm entry but no plant entry.  Firm entry rates for a market are the number of 
entry episodes divided by the average number of firms operating in the market across the current 
and past censuses.
38
  The empirical specification is similar to the market-level exit tests above: we regress 
entry rates in a market-year, which are based on entry between the past and current CMs, on the 
market share of vertically integrated establishments in the previous CM.  As in the exit 
                                                 
37 Again we use the average number of establishments in the denominator rather than just the prior value.  This 
keeps small markets that would otherwise have infinite or extremely high computed entry rates from distorting the 
results.  This transformation preserves relative orderings.  We also weight by market demand in our regressions to 
further adjust for the small-market effect. 
38 There is an additional data difficulty regarding computation of firm-level entry rates.  While firm identifiers in the 
CM remain constant if the plant-owning entity does not change, there is an exception to this.  Single-unit and multi-
unit firms are numbered according to different systems, so when a plant in a single-unit firm becomes part of a 
multi-unit firm, its firm identifier changes from one format to the other.  This presents no measurement problems 
when a formerly single-unit plant is bought by a previously multi-unit firm; the plant simply assumes the identifier 
of the purchasing firm.  However, if the plant is purchased by a firm that was previously only a single-unit firm, or if 
the plant’s owner itself becomes multi-unit by purchasing or opening another plant, the plant’s firm identifier could 
change even though no new firm actually entered the market.  We therefore count as firm entry episodes only those 
instances where a firm identifier changes and the plant either was part of a multi-unit firm in the previous census or 
was previously a single-unit firm and its new firm ID number existed in the previous CM. 
  27regressions, we control for market and year fixed effects as well as market demand growth over 
the period to capture short-run entry impacts of demand fluctuations.  We estimate specifications 
using both overall entry rates, which include entry by integrated and unintegrated producers, and 
entry rates of unintegrated producers alone. 
The results are presented in Table 11, with Panel A showing results for overall entry rates 
and Panel B for unintegrated producers.  There are no significant connections between entry 
rates and the market share of vertically integrated firms.  The economic magnitude of the vertical 
integration coefficients is also small.  As with the market-level exit rate results, even a move 
from one extreme to the other—i.e., a market shifting from a situation where integrated 
producers are completely absent to having 100 percent market share—implies small entry rate 
changes compared to typical values in the data.  For example, even the largest implied effect, 
that on the plant-level entry rates of unintegrated cement producers, moves entry rates by less 
than half of their mean and a third of their standard deviation.  Moreover, the coefficients are not 
even negative for concrete.  In unreported specifications for the concrete industry where we add 
multi-unit firms’ market shares, these shares are tied to lower entry rates (and are typically 
significant).  However, this also made the implied vertical integration effect more positive. 
 
F. Discussion 
The evidence suggests foreclosure effects are not quantitatively important when cement 
and ready-mixed producers vertically integrate.  More extensive integration in a market is not 
tied to higher prices and lower quantities, but rather the opposite.  These patterns are robust to 
numerous empirical specifications and sources of identification.  Even when we focus on 
markets where one would expect foreclosure opportunities to be greater, the negative correlation 
between integration and prices remains.  Exit rates are lower for integrated plants in both the 
upstream and downstream industries, as foreclosure would predict, but we find that this can be 
explained by the fact that integrated plants are more productive and are in larger firms, not 
because of a particular effect of vertical integration itself.  Finally, entry rates do not fall when 
markets become more integrated. 
It seems instead that the data are instead consistent with a story where any effects of 
vertical integration on outcomes instead arise because integrated firms are larger and, especially, 
more productive.  As these more efficient producers expand their presence in a market, they pass 
  28on part of their cost advantages to their customers in lower prices.  This reduces average prices in 
the market directly and also induces their higher-cost unintegrated producers to lower their 
prices.
39  Lower prices in turn increase quantities sold.  Those unintegrated producers who 
cannot remain profitable when facing greater low-cost competition exit. 
  
V. Why Do Integrated Producers Have Higher Productivity Levels? 
The fact that the productivity advantage of vertically integrated producers, rather than 
integration itself, can explain the patterns in the data raises its own issue.  What efficiency gains 
are harnessed through integration, or is the connection merely a correlation?  We look more 
closely at how integrated producers differ from their unintegrated counterparts to try to answer 
this question. 
 
A. How Are Integrated Producers Different? 
We first compare a number of plant-level technology measures across integrated and 
unintegrated producers.  As with the plant-level price, TFP, and quantity comparisons above, we 
regress the variable of interest on an indicator for integration status and a full set of market-year 
fixed effects.  This again focuses on comparisons among integrated and unintegrated producers 
in the same market. 
  These comparisons for each industry’s plants are in Table 12.  Differences among ready-
mixed concrete plants are in Panel A and cement producers in Panel B.
40  Notice first the labor 
productivity differences.  Integrated ready-mixed producers’ labor productivity levels are 33 
percent (29 log points) higher than those of their unintegrated counterparts in the same market.  
This is considerably larger than the TFP differences seen in Table 5, and reflects that fact that, as 
can also be seen in the table, integrated plants are more capital intensive.  In the cement industry, 
integrated producers also have higher labor productivity levels, by just under 10 percent, than 
unintegrated cement plants in their market. 
  Besides being more productive, integrated ready-mixed plants do a larger volume of 
                                                 
39 A negative correlation between price and productivity levels has also been documented in previous empirical 
work (e.g., Roberts and Supina (1996); Eslava, Haltiwanger, Kugler, and Kugler (2004); Syverson (forthcoming); 
and Foster, Haltiwanger, and Syverson (2005)). 
40 The sample size differences across dependent variables reflect variation in the availability of the underlying 
production data necessary to compute the measures.  See the discussion in the appendix. 
  29business than unintegrated plants in their markets; their real revenue is on average about 30 
percent higher.  Despite their higher output, integrated ready-mixed plants do not employ 
significantly more labor (workers or hours), as manifested in the higher labor productivity result.  
There are differences in labor composition, however: nonproduction workers comprise a smaller 
share of the labor force in integrated plants.
41  This suggests that integrated producers may be 
able to harness gains coming from the consolidation of administrative duties, a point to which we 
shall return below.  Comparing cement plants, integrated producers are also considerably larger 
in terms of total sales, have a smaller share of nonproduction workers, and have higher capital-
labor ratios than their unintegrated counterparts.  Unlike in concrete, they also hire more labor. 
Integrated plants are indeed different.  However, these patterns are less useful for 
determining if the differences are caused by vertical integration.  As above, we look at additional 
comparisons that are less likely to confound the causal impacts of vertical integration with 
selection on preexisting heterogeneity.  Panel A of Table 13 compares plants that were 
unintegrated in the previous census but became integrated to those that remained unintegrated 
(we control for market-year fixed effects in this and all of these comparisons).  Those becoming 
integrated in the interim had 10 percent faster labor productivity growth than their market 
counterparts that remained unintegrated.  Echoing the physical quantity comparisons above, sales 
revenue at these newly integrated ready-mixed plants shrink (at least in relative terms; the 
reported coefficients give relative growth rates).
42  Also as previously mentioned, though, the 
decline in sales at acquired concrete plants is on average more than compensated by new 
entrants.  Panels B and C of Table 13 compare integrated entrants to, respectively, unintegrated 
entrants and unintegrated incumbents.  Integrated entrants have higher sales than unintegrated 
entrants, though they hire less labor.  New ready-mixed plants in integrated firms are also 
noticeably more productive than both unintegrated entrants and unintegrated incumbents.  As 
                                                 
41 The U.S. Census Bureau defines production workers (all other employees are considered nonproduction workers) 
as: “Workers (up through the line-supervisor level) engaged in fabricating, processing, assembling, inspecting, 
receiving, packing, warehousing, shipping (but not delivering), maintenance, repair, janitorial, guard services, 
product development, auxiliary production for plant’s own use (e.g., power plant), record keeping, and other closely 
associated services (including truck drivers delivering ready-mixed concrete).  Exclude proprietors and partners.” 
42 While in the absence of randomized integration at the plant level we cannot be sure these estimates reflect 
exclusively causal effects, our productivity-based explanation for the results above requires only that vertical 
integration is correlated with productivity.  We also find it difficult to form a reasonable explanation for the 
observed patterns that implies reverse causation; that is, why integrating firms would explicitly target plants that are 
expected to increase in productivity and shrink in the near future. 
  30with the comparisons among all producers, integrated entrants have lower nonproduction worker 
ratios and are more capital intensive than both comparison groups. 
Similar comparisons for cement plants—not reported here—found no significant 
differences among either continuing plants or entrants.  This suggests, interestingly, that the 
differences seen between integrated and unintegrated cement producers are driven by selection 
into integration based upon pre-existing differences, while some of the differences among ready-
mixed concrete plants are more likely to be a result of becoming integrated (or being newly built 
by an integrated firm).  Moreover, the largest impact vertically integrated firms have on concrete 
markets in terms of productivity may be through their newly built plants.  We return to these 
points below. 
 
B. A Specific Mechanism 
  The findings above, along with a consideration of practical features of the ready-mixed 
concrete industry, suggest an explanation for the observed integration-productivity link: 
improved logistical coordination.  Operating in the ready-mixed industry requires delivering a 
perishable product to time-sensitive buyers in multiple locations.  Having several plants in a 
local area and coordinating deliveries through a central office could benefit a firm by 
consolidating overhead (one dispatcher might handle deliveries from several plants that would 
each have separate dispatchers in single-unit firms) and allowing more efficient use of available 
resources through cross-plant substitution.
43
  This type of productivity gain is consistent with the above findings.  Integrated 
producers’ lower nonproduction worker ratios suggest they have lower overhead labor 
requirements.  The pursuit of coordination efficiencies explains why integrated producers might 
reshuffle production locations in markets by reducing output at purchased plants and replacing it 
with production from their newly built plants, perhaps located nearer spatially shifting demand 
within the market.  Such efficiencies are also used to motivate some stated practices of integrated 
producers.  For instance, the large integrated producer Lafarge (a firm that was just starting to 
develop a sizeable presence in the U.S. at the end of our sample period), describes its preferred 
                                                 
43 In an earlier version of this paper, we explored in detail two other potential sources of integrated producers’ 
productivity advantage: elimination of double marginalization and improved inventory management and production 
smoothing.  We did not find evidence that either was the source of the observed productivity gap.  See Hortaçsu and 
Syverson (2005) for details. 
  31placement of ready-mixed operations in its 2004 20-F filing: 
“…[W]e aim to place our ready mix concrete plants in clusters in each micro market in 
which we operate in order to optimize our delivery flexibility, capacity and backup 
capability.  …  We evaluate each micro market in which we operate periodically and 
dismantle and move plants to locations where they can be used more profitably…”  
(Lafarge 2005, p. 39) 
Plant clustering allows firms to better take advantage of any coordination efficiencies.
44
This begs the question, however, of why cement firms need to be the coordinating body.  
A possible answer is that they need not be.  The ready-mixed industry has seen considerable 
consolidation over our sample—in 1963, 3999 firms owned 4621 ready-mixed plants, but by 
1997, only 2898 firms owned 5252 plants—and much of this consolidation came through 
horizontal rather than vertical mergers.  As seen in Table 2 above, the fraction of ready-mixed 
plants in multi-unit firms more than doubled between 1963 and 1997, from 24.8 to 55.6 percent.  
The corresponding change in the fraction of vertically integrated plants was 1.8 to 10.6 percent.  
Clearly, then, the majority of merged ready-mixed concrete plants were folded into firms without 
cement operations.  Coordination and its possible efficiency gains, if they are tied primarily to 
firm size, have therefore not been exclusive to vertically integrated firms.
45
  We explore this notion further by repeating our earlier comparisons across integrated and 
unintegrated plants, but this time adding to the specification the total ready-mixed sales of the 
plant’s firm in the CEA.  If logistics coordination benefits are facilitated by having a greater 
extent of local concrete operations, controlling for the size of the firm’s local ready-mixed sales 
will let us see if the relationships observed above between vertical integration and concrete 
                                                 
44 We note that nothing about these efficiency gains requires spatial proximity between an integrated firm’s cement 
and concrete operations, or even that the upstream division supply the downstream division at all.  Indeed, Lafarge 
owns about two dozen ready-mixed plants in Colorado and Wyoming even though its nearest cement distribution 
terminal is 490 miles away in Oklahoma City.  We contacted some of these plants, and they confirmed that they 
receive all of their cement inputs from sources outside of Lafarge.  A similar situation exists for Florida Rock 
Industries Inc., an integrated producer that owns ready-mixed plants in Florida, Southern Georgia, Virginia, and 
Maryland.  The firm’s cement facilities, however, are all located in Florida, and the company’s financial filings state 
that the company’s concrete operations purchased cement from 10 outside suppliers (Florida Rock Industries, Inc. 
2005).  Phone calls to management verified complete external cement sourcing among the company’s 30 or so 
ready-mixed plants in Virginia and Maryland.  We also note that these practices are hard to reconcile with 
foreclosure motives.  Foreclosure necessarily implies that integrated downstream producers are at the very least 
being partially supplied by upstream producers in their firm. 
45 That is not to say that a large firm in any industry could harness coordinating economies, of course.  But cement 
shares a final demand sector with ready-mixed and the two industries do have other key elements in common, such 
as the prominence of logistical concerns. 
  32plants’ prices, productivity levels, scale, and technologies are tied to this. 
  The results of this exercise, shown in Table 14, are instructive, especially in comparison 
to the earlier plant-level price, TFP, and quantity contrasts as well as Panel A of Table 12.  When 
we control for local concrete sales, the magnitude of vertically integrated plants’ price and 
productivity differences falls and their significance disappears.  In other words, while plants in 
vertically integrated firms charge lower prices and are more productive on average than 
unintegrated plants, they do not have significantly different prices or TFP levels than plants in 
unintegrated firms having equally sized local concrete sales.  Recall that most of the plant- and 
market-level relationships between vertical integration and outcomes above become insignificant 
once we control for multi-unit status and TFP.  These results suggest that firm size and TFP are 
integrally related; specifically, that the firms’ horizontal size downstream is linked to how 
efficient its individual concrete plants are.  Their productivity advantage in turn allows them to 
charge lower prices and makes them more likely to survive.
46  Some differences do remain, 
however between integrated and unintegrated plants whose firms have similar downstream sales: 
integrated plants are smaller (i.e., the same sales are spread across more plants), they still have a 
labor productivity advantage, and use less overhead labor. 
  On whole, this evidence, both anecdotal and from our data, appears to suggest that 
vertical integration per se might not be the primary source of integrated producers’ productivity 
advantage.  Rather, integrated producers—as with any producer with sufficient size and perhaps 
the necessary complementary managerial talent, even one with a purely horizontal firm 
organization—seem to be able to take advantage of the logistical coordination gains from having 
geographically clustered plants whose logistics are centrally managed. 
 
VI. Concluding Remarks 
We have used unusually detailed data to investigate vertical integration in the cement and 
ready-mixed concrete industries, with a particular focus on the possible foreclosure effects of 
integration.  These industries hold several features that make them an excellent candidate for an 
empirical case study on the issue.  Their downstream markets are highly geographically 
                                                 
46 The strictest interpretation of the logistics coordination story would imply that the large-firm and TFP impacts 
would be perfectly collinear, as one completely explains the other.  We do not observe this in the data, probably 
because, among other reasons, multi-unit status is a noisy measure of firm in the downstream market, and there are 
almost surely other firm-specific determinants of productivity that are not related to firm size. 
  33segmented (especially for ready-mixed, where the vast majority of output is shipped less than 
100 miles), providing us with considerable variation to empirically identify effects of interest.  
Second, cement and ready-mixed are relatively homogeneous in physical attributes and have 
little brand differentiation.  Therefore the competitive effects we find—on prices, for instance—
more likely arise from market structure changes than from product mix alterations.  Third, we 
have access to detailed plant-level production information for these industries, affording more 
variation in vertical market structures (thousands of producers operating in hundreds of local 
markets over a 34-year time span) than was typically available to previous researchers, and 
allowing us to study interacting effects that previous studies by necessity examined in isolation.  
We also explore for the first time elements of theoretical models that have not yet (to our 
knowledge) been studied empirically, including vertical integration’s long-run competitive 
impacts on entry and exit.  Finally, vertical integration among producers in these two industries 
has been the focus of substantial policy attention both in the U.S. and elsewhere. 
We find little evidence that foreclosure takes place when firms integrate in these 
industries.  Instead, prices fall, quantities rise, and entry rates do not change when markets 
become more integrated (measured either by the market share or number of vertically integrated 
firms in the market). 
These patterns are consistent with an alternative, efficiency-based mechanism.  Namely, 
that greater vertical integration in a market corresponds to the expansion of larger, more 
productive integrated firms as they take market share from higher-priced, less efficient 
producers.  This alternative explanation is reflected in the fact that, once we control for firm size 
and productivity impacts, there is very little role for vertical integration itself in explaining plant- 
and market-level outcomes.  We went on to show evidence suggesting that linking integration, 
firm size, and productivity are gains in logistical coordination efficiencies tied to having multiple 
concrete plants in the same market.  However, these efficiencies appear not to be tied to vertical 
integration itself, but rather firm size in the downstream market more generally. 
Our results, if correct, point to an interesting tradeoff for the social welfare implications 
of vertical integration.  It may be that in the cement and ready-mixed industries, vertical 
integration is just one way for large, efficient firms to enter a market.  In fact there has been 
extensive consolidation in the ready-mixed industry over the past four decades, and vertical 
integration has been one way in which industry plants have been folded into larger firms.  As we 
  34show above, the churning process underlying such consolidations may have had significant 
impacts on productivity in the industry.  This presents again the familiar difficulty of balancing 
efficiency and market power considerations in merger analysis. 
We conclude by emphasizing that one should be careful when trying to generalize the 
results in this paper to other industries or markets.  Vertical integration decisions of firms are 
driven by many different considerations, of which vertical foreclosure may or may not be 
important in any particular case.  Our study is an attempt to study the short- and long-term 
effects of the decision to integrate in these particular industries.  The fact that we do not find 
evidence of foreclosure here does not mean that market power gains made possible through 
vertical integration are not quantitatively important elsewhere. 
 
  35Data Appendix 
We describe here details on the construction of our production variables.  We first note that while the 
Census of Manufactures microdata contains enormous amounts of production information, it does not offer full 
coverage for every variable discussed below.  Very small plants (typically with fewer than five employees)—called 
Administrative Record (AR) establishments—have imputed data for most production variables.  AR plants amount 
to roughly one-sixth of cement establishments and one-third of ready-mixed plants, but because of their small size 
they comprise much smaller share of employment (0.6 percent in cement—these are almost surely grinding-only 
plants without kilns—and 5.1 percent in ready-mixed) and output (0.8 and 4.3 percent in cement and ready-mixed, 
respectively).  Due to the imputations, we exclude AR plants from analyses that compare production variables like 
productivity, output, or prices.  However, we are of course able to use these plants when computing entry and exit 
rates or integration status.  Additionally, not every variable was collected in each census.  For example, equipment 
capital stocks were not collected in 1963 and 1997, making it impossible to compute TFP values and capital-to-labor 
ratios during these years.  We have removed likely imputes (they are not explicitly flagged) from our sample using 
methods described in Roberts and Supina (1996) and Syverson (forthcoming). 
  Labor Hours.  Production worker hours are reported directly in the CM microdata.  This value is then 
scaled up to total hours by multiplying by the ratio of total employees to production workers.  This assumes, in 
essence, that average non-production worker hours equal average production worker hours within plants. 
  Capital Stocks.  Equipment and building capital stocks are plants’ reported book values of each capital type 
deflated by the book-to-real value ratio for the corresponding three-digit industry.  (These industry-level equipment 
and structures stocks are from published Bureau of Economic Analysis data.)  Any reported machinery or building 
rentals by the plant are inflated to stocks by dividing by a type-specific rental rate.
47  The total productive capital 
stock kit is the sum of the equipment and structures stocks. 
  Real Materials and Energy Use.  Materials and energy inputs are plants’ reported expenditures on each 
divided by their respective industry-level deflators from the NBER Productivity Database. 
  Labor Productivity.  We measure labor productivity as plant output per worker-hour, where output is the 
real value of shipments and hours are constructed as above. 
  Total Factor Productivity (Revenue- and Physical-Quantity-Based).  We measure productivity using a 
standard total factor productivity index.  Plant TFP is computed as its logged output minus a weighted sum of its 
logged labor, capital, materials, and energy inputs.  That is,  
it et it mt it kt it lt it it e m k l y TFP α α α α − − − − = , 
where the weights αj are the input elasticities of input j∈{l, k, m, e}.  While inputs are plant-specific, we use 
industry-level input cost shares to measure the input elastiticies.
48  These cost shares are computed using reported 
                                                 
47 Capital rental rates are from unpublished data constructed by the Bureau of Labor Statistics for use in computing 
their Multifactor Productivity series.  Formulas, related methodology, and data sources are described in U.S. Bureau 
of Labor Statistics (1983) and Harper, Berndt, and Wood (1989). 
48 This index makes a few implicit assumptions that are worth discussing further.  One is that returns to scale are 
constant.  If the scale elasticity were instead different from one, each of the input elasticities αj should be multiplied 
 industry-level labor, materials, and energy expenditures from the NBER Productivity Database (which is itself 
constructed from the CM).  Capital expenditures are constructed as the reported industry equipment and building 
stocks multiplied by their respective capital rental rates in cement and ready-mixed concrete’s corresponding two-
digit industry. 
  For both industries, we construct TFP measures using plants’ reported revenues (deflated to 1987 dollars 
using price indexes from the NBER Productivity Database) as an output measure.  This is the standard measure used 
in the literature, and is the one we use in the investigation of plant exit patterns.  (This revenue-based measure is 
used both so that the results from both industries can be compared and because as explained in Foster, Haltiwanger, 
and Syverson (2005), revenue-based productivity measures embody both technology- and demand-side profitability 
fundamentals that determine exit probabilities.)  However, for ready-mixed plants when data is available, we also 
construct a TFP measure based on the plant’s physical output.  This removes the influence of within-industry price 
variation on the output measure.  This is the TFP concept used in all other exercises that use only ready-mixed 
concrete plants. 
We must make one adjustment to the output data when computing physical-output TFP.  Since ready-
mixed plants can produce multiple products (though most do not, as discussed above), but inputs are reported on an 
establishment-wide rather than product-specific basis, we must impute the share of inputs allocated to ready-mixed 
production in multi-product plants.  We do so by dividing reported ready-mixed output by its share of total 
establishment sales.  This adjustment in effect assumes inputs are used proportionately to each product’s revenue 
share.  (For example, a plant producing 1000 yd
3 of ready-mixed concrete accounting for 80 percent of its revenues 
will have the same TFP as a completely specialized plant producing 1250 yd
3 with same measured inputs.) 
Output and Factor Prices.  We use product-level revenue and physical production and consumption data 
from the CM Product and Materials Supplements to compute ready-mixed plants’ unit concrete output prices and 
cement factor input prices.  We then adjust these to a common 1987 basis using the corresponding four-digit-
industry-level shipments deflators from the NBER Productivity Database.   
There are two important notes regarding these calculated unit prices.  First, the value of shipments (sales 
revenue) data is collected on a free-on-board basis, i.e., exclusive of any shipping costs.  Prices should reflect not the 
delivered cost of the ready-mixed but rather what one could buy it for at the plant gate.  Second, the unit prices are 
annual averages.  This can be shown to be equivalent to a quantity-weighted average of all transaction prices 
charged by the plant during the year.  We do not observe product-specific data for administrative record (AR) plants, 
so they are dropped from the analysis as in the core sample.  We also remove a small number of gross outliers 
having prices greater than five times or less than one-fifth the median in a given year, and limit the sample to those 
                                                                                                                                                             
by the scale elasticity.  In earlier work, Syverson (2004) finds that returns to scale in ready-mixed concrete are 
essentially constant.  Also, using industry-level input elasticities assumes that all plants in the industry use the same 
technology.  While a common assumption in the literature, the fact that we observe different capital intensities at 
vertically integrated plants could raise questions about whether this is appropriate.  However, different input 
intensities can also result from producers facing different factor prices.  In this case, it would imply integrated 
producers face lower capital prices than do unintegrated producers.  Given that integrated plants are owned by firms 
that are on average substantially larger than those owning unintegrated plants, and as such may have access to easier 
credit, we find such a factor price difference plausible.  
 plants with ready-mixed sales accounting for over one-half of yearly revenues.  (This sample criterion is not very 
restrictive in practice; most ready-mixed producers are specialists.)  Finally, we attempt to exclude any non-AR 
plants who have (mostly because of incomplete reporting) physical quantities imputed by the Census Bureau.  
Unfortunately, these imputes are not flagged.  To distinguish and remove imputed product-level data from the 
sample, we use the techniques described in detail in Roberts and Supina (1996) and Foster, Haltiwanger, and 
Syverson (2005). 
Imputing Construction Sector Employment when County Business Patterns Data Is Missing.  County 
Business Patterns data occasionally have missing observations due to data disclosure regulations.  The construction 
sector’s ubiquity and abundance of small firms allows full disclosure of total employment in nearly all counties, 
however (employment data is withheld in roughly 1.5 percent of the county-year observations).  We impute 
employment when missing by multiplying the number of establishments in each of nine employment ranges (which 
are always reported) by the midpoint of their respective employment ranges, and summing the result.  The impact of 
using imputes is likely to be even less than their proportion indicates, as the typically small nondisclosure counties 
are less likely to contain ready-mixed plants. 
Construction of Antitrust Policy and Spatial Demand Instruments.  In our IV specifications, we use three 
sets of instruments.  Two use variation in antitrust enforcement across our markets and the other works off spatial 
patterns of demand (i.e., construction activity) within concrete and cement markets. 
The first antitrust policy instrument is an indicator equal to one if the smallest firm in a market has a share 
of at least four percent.  This is based on the fact that U.S. antitrust authorities’ horizontal merger guidelines have 
changed over time.  During a particularly strict period, any merger involving a firm with more than four percent 
market share was open to challenge.  Thus in markets where the smallest firm was already above that threshold, any 
merger in the market would be suspect.  Since the guidelines applied across industries, these guidelines were 
obviously exogenous to structure in any given ready-mixed concrete market, and should be exogenous shifters of 
horizontal market structure.  We interact the indicator with another equal to one during the 1967, 1972, and 1977 
CMs, since this is the period in which the policy was in effect. 
The second antitrust policy instrument comes directly from the FTC’s antitrust actions in the cement and 
ready-mixed industries.  In January 1967, in response to industry complaints about the unpredictability of merger 
challenges, the FTC announced a set of guidelines that promised challenges to any acquisitions by cement producers 
of any “substantial” ready-mixed concrete company.  “Substantial” was defined as a ready-mixed firm that was one 
of the four largest in its market or one that used over 50,000 barrels of cement per year (Wall Street Journal, 1967).  
This rule was dropped by 1977.  Since the combined market share of substantial firms plausibly varies across 
markets for reasons unrelated to equilibrium outcomes (at the very least once exogenous demand is conditioned 
upon), some markets are likely to receive more FTC scrutiny than others simply due to the specifics of the rule.  As 
with the changes in the horizontal merger guidelines, the fact that the rule was only in effect during the 1967 through 
1977 CMs also creates intertemporal variation in enforcement likelihoods.  We therefore construct for each market-
year in our sample the total market share of substantial concrete firms.  The FTC considered a ready-mixed firm 
“substantial” if it was one of the four largest in its market or if it used over 50,000 barrels of cement a year.  The 
 first criterion is easily evaluated using plant-level revenue aggregated to the firm level within the market.  For the 
cement-use criterion, we employed the CM materials supplement.  This data allows us to observe the physical 
quantity of cement purchases made by a subsample of ready-mixed concrete plants.  We regressed cement purchases 
on plant revenues for these plants (which tended to be the largest in the industry) to obtain a total firm revenue value 
such that firms with greater real sales than this would be expected to buy more than 50,000 barrels of cement.  This 
allowed us to determine which firms met the FTC’s second definition of “substantial” even if we did not observe 
physical cement purchases for the entire firm.  Finally, we interact this share of substantial firms with an indicator 
variable denoting the 1967, 1972, and 1977 CMs as above.  This variation in likely FTC scrutiny is used to 
instrument for the extent of integration. 
The third instrument set reflects measures of the dispersion of demand within our sample markets.  They 
are constructed from the county-level construction employment data aggregated to the market level above.  We use 
three measures: the standard deviation in both the (log) level and growth rates of demand across the market’s 
counties, and the HHI of counties’ construction employment shares in the market (here, employment is in levels 
rather than logs).  The logic of these instruments is as follows.  As with the market-level aggregates, they should be 
exogenous to ready-mixed market outcomes because of concrete’s small share in construction costs.  Further, 
demand (or demand growth) variation across areas in a market plausibly impacts the returns to a firm owning 
multiple plants.  If demand is concentrated in a small space, a firm may be able to serve it sufficiently with a single 
plant (albeit possibly a large one, depending on the level of demand).  But if demand is instead spread spatially, the 
industry’s high transport costs may make it worthwhile to own several plants throughout the market.  Both the 
standard deviation of logged employment and the HHI of employment levels measure the market’s spatial demand 
variation, for a given demand level (which we control for directly in the regressions).  The standard deviation in 
demand growth rates measures the market’s demand volatility, which may give firms an incentive to own multiple 
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 Table 1. Market-Level Relationships between Average Prices, Total Quantities, and the Extent of Integration 
 
 

















2 0.065 0.070 0.072 0.185 0.430 0.429 0.890 0.891 
VI market share  -0.143* 
(0.029)    1.532* 
(0.290)    -0.083* 
(0.041)    0.331* 
(0.154)   
Number of VI firms    -0.037* 
(0.006)    0.637* 
(0.043)    -0.014 
(0.011)    0.153* 
(0.034) 
Market  fixed  effects?  No No No No Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
 
Notes: The table shows the coefficients obtained by regressing quantity-weighted average concrete prices and total concrete quantities sold in a market on either 
the market share or number of vertically integrated firms operating in the market.  The sample is comprised of 1873 market-year observations.  Standard errors 
clustered by market.  An asterisk denotes significance at the five percent level. 
 
 Table 2. Evolution of Vertical Integration in the Cement and Ready-Mixed Concrete Industries 
 
 
Year  1963 1967 1972 1977 1982 1987 1992 1997 
Percentage of cement plants that are 
vertically integrated  21.9 47.4 41.9 34.8 32.5 35.2 49.5 30.5 
Percentage of cement sales from vertically 
integrated producers  25.2 51.2 48.4 41.0 49.5 51.3 75.1 55.4 
          
Percentage of ready-mixed plants that are 
vertically integrated  1.8 3.2 3.8 3.1 3.0 5.5  11.1  10.6 
Percentage of ready-mixed sales from 
vertically integrated producers  6.1 8.9  10.0  8.7 8.5  11.3  14.4  14.2 
Percentage of ready-mixed plants in multi-
unit firms  24.8 26.4 32.2 34.3 35.4 41.7 49.6 55.6 
Percentage of ready-mixed sales from 
plants in multi-unit firms  40.1 46.3 52.4 54.0 50.9 57.5 61.3 65.0 
 
Notes: The table shows the fraction of plants (or sales) accounted for by firms of various organizational types in the cement and ready-mixed concrete industries. 
 
 
 Table 3. Summary Statistics of Market Structure in the Cement and Ready-Mixed Industries 
 
 
 Average  1
st quartile  2
nd quartile  3
rd quartile  Maximum 
Ready-mixed concrete (2767 CEA-year markets)           
Number of plants  14.6  5  10  17  125 
Number of firms  11.8  5  8  14  110 
Number of VI firms  0.3  0  0  0  6 
Number of VI firms (if >0)  1.4  1  1  2  6 
Market share of VI firms (if >0)  0.314  0.128  0.270  0.430  1.000 
HHI  3001 1585 2464 3832  10000 
       
Cement (208 USGS-year markets)           
Number of plants  8.3  5  7  11  24 
Number  of  firms  7.1 5 6.5 9 23 
Number of VI firms  2.5  1  2  4  7 
HHI  2795 1990 2362 3348  10000 
 
Notes: The table shows moments of the distribution of market structure measures for the cement and ready-mixed concrete industries.  See text for details and 
market definition. 
 Table 4. Vertical Integration and Ready-Mixed Concrete Prices: Plant-Level Results 
 
  Within-market difference    Change for continuers 
  [1] [2] [3] [4]    [5] [6] [7] [8] 
N  12553  12553 8555 8555    4025 4025 2439 2439 
R
2 0.424 0.425 0.501 0.501    0.456 0.460 0.575 0.576 
































            
  Integrated vs. unintegrated entrants    Integrated entrants vs. unintegrated incumbents 
 [9]  [10]  [11]  [12]    [13] [14] [15] [16] 
N  2771 2771 2025 2025    7490 7490 6104 6104 
R
2 0.563 0.566 0.655 0.655    0.430 0.430 0.523 0.523 




















   n/a  n/a 









Notes: The table shows the results from regressing plant-level concrete prices on a number of variables.  VI (MU) indictor is equal to one if the plant is in a 
vertically integrated (multi-unit/multi-plant) firm and zero otherwise; TFP is the plant’s quantity-based total factor productivity.  See text for details.  In the VI 
entrants vs. non-VI incumbents comparison, there are no observations of new MU entrants that are not also VI entrants.  All regressions include market-year 
fixed effects.  An asterisk denotes significance at the five percent level. 
 
 
 Table 5. Plant-Level Total Factor Productivity (TFP) Comparisons 
 
 










  [1] [2] [3] [4] 
N  8555 2439 2025 6104 
R
2 0.308 0.419 0.573 0.352 









Notes: The table shows the results from regressing ready-mixed concrete plants’ TFP levels on an indicator for the plant being in a vertically integrated firm.  All 
regressions include market-year fixed effects.  An asterisk denotes significance at the five percent level. 
 
 Table 6. Vertical Integration and Ready-Mixed Concrete Prices: Market-Level Results 
 
 
A. Benchmark Specifications 
 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9]  [10] 
N  1870 1870 1870 1550 1550 1870 1870 1870 1550 1550 
R
2 0.087 0.433 0.434 0.573 0.573 0.087 0.432 0.432 0.573 0.573 









(0.039)       
Mkt share of MU firms      -0.015 
(0.022)    0.001 
(0.024)       










Number  of  MU  firms            -0.003 
(0.004)    -0.004 
(0.004) 
Quantity-wt  avg  TFP      -0.293* 
(0.054) 
-0.293* 




Market fixed effects?  No  Yes  Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Notes: The panel shows the coefficients obtained by regressing quantity-weighted average concrete prices in a market on either the market share or number of 
vertically integrated firms operating in the market.  The market share or number of multi-unit firms and the quantity-weighted average TFP in the market are also 
included in some specifications.  All regressions control for the HHI and density of demand in the market as well as year effects (coefficients not reported).  
Standard errors clustered by market.  An asterisk denotes significance at the five percent level. 
 
 
 Table 6. Vertical Integration and Ready-Mixed Concrete Prices: Market-Level Results (cont.) 
 
 
B. Robustness Checks 
 
  Antitrust and spatial demand IV  Multiple-market mergers  Adding state-year effects 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9]  [10]  [11]  [12] 
N  1870 1870 1550 1550  142  142  133  133  1870 1870 1550 1550 
R
2 n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  0.453 0.472 0.584 0.602 0.586 0.586 0.681 0.681 























































Notes: The panel shows the coefficients obtained by regressing quantity-weighted average concrete prices in a market on the market share of vertically integrated 
firms operating in the market.  The market share of multi-unit firms and the quantity-weighted average TFP in the market are also included in some 
specifications.  All regressions control for the HHI and density of demand in the market as well as year effects (coefficients not reported).  The various 
identification approaches, listed in the header row, are detailed in the text.  Standard errors clustered by market.  An asterisk denotes significance at the five 
percent level.
 Table 7. Vertical Integration and Ready-Mixed Concrete Quantities: Plant-Level Results 
 
 
  Within-market difference    Change for continuers 
  [1] [2] [3] [4]    [5] [6] [7] [8] 
N  12553  12553 8555 8555    4025 4025 2439 2439 
R
2 0.359 0.362 0.376 0.377    0.457 0.457 0.539 0.540 
































            
  Integrated vs. unintegrated entrants    Integrated entrants vs. unintegrated incumbents 
 [9]  [10]  [11]  [12]    [13] [14] [15] [16] 
N  2771 2771 2025 2025    7490 7490 6104 6104 
R
2 0.543 0.544 0.601 0.602    0.367 0.367 0.392 0.392 




















   N/A      N/A 









Notes: The table shows the results from regressing plant-level physical output on a number of variables.  VI (MU) indictor is equal to one if the plant is in a 
vertically integrated (multi-unit/multi-plant) firm and zero otherwise; TFP is the plant’s quantity-based total factor productivity.  See text for details.  In the VI 
entrants vs. non-VI incumbents comparison, there are no observations of new MU entrants that are not also VI entrants.  All regressions include market-year 
fixed effects.  An asterisk denotes significance at the five percent level. 
 Table 8. Vertical Integration and Ready-Mixed Concrete Quantities: Market-Level Results 
 
 
A. Benchmark Specifications 
 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9]  [10] 
N  1870 1870 1870 1550 1550 1870 1870 1870 1550 1550 
R
2 0.781 0.904 0.907 0.923 0.926 0.785 0.905 0.908 0.924 0.927 










     




     














Quantity-wt  avg  TFP      0.380* 
(0.088) 
0.367* 




Market fixed effects?  No  Yes  Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Notes: The panel shows the coefficients obtained by regressing the total (logged) quantity of ready-mixed concrete sold in a market on either the market share or 
number of vertically integrated firms operating in the market.  The market share or number of multi-unit firms and the quantity-weighted average TFP in the 
market are also included in some specifications.  All regressions control for the HHI and density of demand in the market as well as year effects (coefficients not 
reported).  Standard errors clustered by market.  An asterisk denotes significance at the five percent level. 
 
 
 Table 8. Vertical Integration and Ready-Mixed Concrete Quantities: Market-Level Results (cont.) 
 
 
B. Robustness Checks 
 
  Antitrust and spatial demand IV  Multiple-market mergers  Adding state-year effects 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9]  [10]  [11]  [12] 
N  1870 1870 1550 1550  142  142  133  133  1870 1870 1550 1550 
R
2 n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  0.829 0.836 0.858 0.863 0.923 0.929 0.942 0.944 























































Notes: The panel shows the coefficients obtained by regressing the total (logged) quantity of ready-mixed concrete sold in a market on either the market share or 
number of vertically integrated firms operating in the market.  The market share of multi-unit firms and the quantity-weighted average TFP in the market are also 
included in some specifications.  All regressions control for the HHI and density of demand in the market as well as year effects (coefficients not reported).  The 
various identification approaches, listed in the header row, are detailed in the text.  Standard errors clustered by market.  An asterisk denotes significance at the 
five percent level. 
 
  
 Table 9. Market Ex-ante Foreclosure Potential, Vertical Integration, and Concrete Prices and Quantities 
 
 
 Vertically  integrated 
cement monopolist 
Cement HHI above mean  Low import presence  Light antitrust 
enforcement period 
  Q-wt avg P  Total Q  Q-wt avg P  Total Q  Q-wt avg P  Total Q  Q-wt avg P  Total Q 
 [1]  [2]  [3]  [4]  [5]  [6]  [7]  [8] 
R
2 0.087 0.783 0.087 0.784 0.096 0.783 0.088 0.782 





















































Notes: This table shows market-level price and quantity regressions where the coefficient on the extent of integration measure is allowed to vary for differing 
types of markets.  All specifications estimated from a sample of 1870 CEA market-years.  All regressions control for the HHI and density of demand in the 
market as well as year effects (coefficients not reported).  See text for details.  Standard errors clustered by market.  An asterisk denotes significance at the five 
percent level. 
 
 Table 10. Integration and Exit Probabilities 
 
 
A. Likelihood of Exit Across Integrated and Unintegrated Plants 
 
  Concrete (N = 24,042)    Cement (N = 1010) 
  [1] [2] [3] [4]    [5] [6] [7] [8] 
R
2 0.091 0.097 0.092 0.098  0.446 0.472 0.447 0.473 















MU indicator    -0.087* 
(0.007)    -0.084*





based)     -0.075*
(0.013)
-0.058*





Notes: The table shows results from linear probability models where the dependent variable is an indicator equal to 
one if the plant exits by the next CM.  Market-year fixed effects are included in all regressions.  An asterisk denotes 
significance at five percent. 
 
 
B. Market-level non-VI exit rates (non-VI exits  ÷ avg non-VI estabs in market over last two 
censuses) 
 
 Concrete    Cement 
 [1]    [3] 
N 1725    126 
R
2 0.265  0.537 





Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy indicating plant exit by the next CM.  The sample is restricted to non-VI 
plants.  Standard errors clustered by market.  An asterisk denotes significance at five percent. 
 Table 11. Integration and Entry Rates 
 
 
A. Overall entry rate (number of entrants ÷ average plants/firms in market over last two CMs) 
 
 Concrete    Cement 
  Plant-level 
entry rate 
Firm-level 




N 1725  1725    127  127 
R
2 0.321 0.354    0.282  0.423 
Mkt. share of integrated 











B. Unintegrated producer entry rate (number of unintegrated entrants ÷ average plants/firms in 
market over last two CMs) 
 
 Concrete    Cement 
  Plant-level 
entry rate 
Firm-level 




N 1725  1725    127  127 
R
2 0.330 0.366    0.234  0.332 
Mkt. share of integrated 










Notes:  This table shows the impact of integration on entry rates.  Panel A shows the results of 
regressing overall plant- and firm-level entry rates in a market (see text for definitions) on the 
market share of integrated firms in the base year.  Panel B shows similar results for entry rates of 
unintegrated producers alone.  Observations are weighted by market demand.  (Similar patterns 
were observed using lagged number of VI firms as the explanatory variable, not reported here.)  
Standard errors are clustered by market.  An asterisk denotes significance at five percent.
 Table 12. Differences Between Integrated and Unintegrated Producers 
 
 
A. Ready-Mixed Concrete 
 









N  31061 31,770 31,485 31,075 31,480 18,703 
R
2 0.217 0.213 0.168 0.166 0.181 0.331 

























N  1476 1484 1480 1476 1480  902 
R
2 0.552  0.56  0.584 0.574 0.492 0.546 













Notes: This table reports differences in key dependent variables (listed at the head of each column) across integrated 
and unintegrated producers in the ready-mixed concrete and cement industries.  The reported coefficients are those 
for an indicator variable denoting that a plant is in a vertically integrated firm.  Market-year fixed effects are 
included in all specifications.  An asterisk denotes significance at five percent.
 Table 13. Becoming Integrated: Ready-Mixed Concrete Continuers and Entrants 
 
 
A. Changes among Continuers (conditioning on being unintegrated in previous CM) 
 









N  15,919 16,358 16,274 15,933  9166  16,271 
R
2 0.194 0.274 0.204 0.217 0.189 0.180 














B. Integrated Entrants Compared to Unintegrated Entrants 
 









N  7681 8005 7871 7687 7870 5405 
R
2 0.330 0.339 0.325 0.323  0.34  0.433 














C. Integrated Entrants Compared to Unintegrated Incumbents 
 









N  18,038 18,310 18,220 18,045 18,217 12,760 
R
2 0.240 0.228 0.193 0.195 0.222 0.378 













Notes: This table reports differences in key dependent variables (listed at the head of each column) across integrated 
and unintegrated producers.  Panel A compares growth rates across integrated and unintegrated continuers (plants 
that survive for two consecutive CMs).  Panel B compares integrated and unintegrated entrants (plants appearing in 
their first CM).  Panel C compares integrated entrants to unintegrated incumbents.  Market-year fixed effects are 
included in all specifications.  An asterisk denotes significance at five percent.
 Table 14. Differences between Integrated and Unintegrated Ready-Mixed Concrete Plants, 
Controlling for Firm’s Total Sales in Local Market 
 
 
  Output 
Price  TFPQ  Phys. 








N 12553  8555  12553    31061  31,468  18,702 
R
2 0.426 0.329 0.624  0.292 0.187  0.35 



























Notes: This table reports differences in key dependent variables (listed at the head of each column) across integrated 
and unintegrated producers in the ready-mixed concrete industry.  The reported coefficients are those for a vertically 
integrated plant dummy and the coefficient on the (log of the) total concrete sales of the plant’s firm in the local 
market.  Market-year fixed effects are included in all specifications.  An asterisk denotes significance at five percent. 
 
 